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Credibility is central to the legal treatment of sexual violence, as epitomized by 
the iconic “he said/she said” contest. Over time, the resolution of competing factual 
accounts has evidenced a deeply skeptical orientation toward rape accusers. This 
incredulous stance remains firmly lodged, having migrated from formal legal rules to 
informal practices, with much the same result—an enduring system of disbelief. 
Introducing the concept of “credibility discounting” helps to explain the dominant 
feature of our legal response to rape. Although false reports of rape are uncommon, 
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law enforcement officers tend to default to doubt when women allege sexual assault, 
resulting in curtailed investigations as well as infrequent arrests and prosecutions. 
Credibility discounts, which are meted out at every stage of the criminal process, 
involve downgrades both to trustworthiness (corresponding to testimonial injustice) 
and to plausibility (corresponding to hermeneutical injustice). 
By conceptualizing prejudiced disbelief as a distinct failure of justice, one 
deserving of separate consideration, we may begin to grasp the full implications of 
credibility discounting, beyond faulty criminal justice outcomes. Attending to this 
failure of epistemic justice on its own terms advances a conversation about how best 
to reform institutions so that credibility judgments do not perpetuate inequality. To 
this end, credibility discounting should count as actionable discrimination. Under 
certain conditions, moreover, this recognition raises constitutional concerns. When 
rape victims confront a law enforcement regime predisposed to dismiss their 
complaints, they are effectively denied the protective resources of the state. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Rape allegations are, and always have been, deeply intertwined with questions 
of credibility. In the paradigmatic case of “he said/she said,” accuser and accused 
offer two opposing versions of events: one party is telling the truth; the other is 
not. To pick between competing accounts, the decider must judge credibility. 
Accusers—typically women1—do not tend to fare well in these contests. 
Over time, skepticism of rape complaints has remained firmly lodged, 
migrating from formal legal rules to informal practices, toward much the 
same end—the dismissal of women’s reports of sexual violation. Although 
systemic disbelief is variegated,2 the staying power of what I call “credibility 
discounting” is the dominant feature of our legal response to rape.3 
While I will later elaborate on this idea of credibility discounting, I use the 
term to refer to an unwarranted failure to credit an assertion where this failure 
stems from prejudice.4 Abundant evidence exists that credibility discounts are 
meted out at every stage of the criminal process: by police officers,5 
prosecutors,6 jurors,7 and judges.8 So too are credibility discounts offered by 
 
1 Nationwide survey data suggests that nearly one in five women have been raped at some point 
in their lives; for men, the figure is one in seventy-one. MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., NAT’L CTR. 
FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE 
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 1 
(2011) [hereinafter NISVS], http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NC45-5DRG]. 
2 Relevant dimensions include characteristics of the accuser, characteristics of the accused, and 
characteristics of the accusation. 
3 I aim to conceptualize a set of normative constructs, rather than apply social psychological 
insights, to explain how implicit bias operates. By attempting to theorize a distinct kind of injustice 
and how it operates on the ground, my orientation is different from a behavioral approach, although 
implicit bias experts would generally agree that becoming more versed in the workings of implicit 
bias is no substitute for a deep account of how the privileging of certain belief structures over others 
perpetuates hierarchy. 
4 For a further discussion of how prejudice bears on credibility discounting, see infra notes 
246–59 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 159–208 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 209–39 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 217–34 and accompanying text. 
8 Credibility discounting at sentencing lies outside the confines of this discussion. It is worth 
nothing, however, that the issue obliquely surfaced in the recent high-profile case of former Stanford 
swimmer Brock Turner, whose six-month sentence for sexually assaulting an unconscious woman 
generated widespread outrage, at least in part because the judge’s remarks indicated that he credited 
the defendant’s version of events despite a contrary jury verdict. See Sam Levin, Stanford Sexual 
Assault: Read the Full Text of the Judge’s Controversial Decision, GUARDIAN (June 14, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/14/stanford-sexual-assault-read-sentence-judge-
aaron-persky?CMP=share_btn_tw [https://perma.cc/LSD3-2VT8] (“I mean, I take [the defendant] 
at his word that, subjectively, that’s his version of events. The jury, obviously, found it to be not the 
sequence of events. . . . But the trial is a search for the truth. It’s an imperfect process. And there’s 
ambiguity at each stage of the proceedings.”). 
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those who form judgments about the veracity of rape accusations from outside 
the criminal process.9 
This has always been true, but ongoing sociolegal developments have 
further elevated the importance of these evaluations. One such development 
has been the gradual dislodging of stranger rape as archetypical,10 
accompanied by a growing recognition that the vast majority of sexual 
violence is committed by an acquaintance without the use of weapons or 
abundant physical force.11 This greater awareness has in turn propelled 
nationwide efforts to eliminate the traditional force requirement from the 
statutory definition of rape.12 
With this progression toward consent-based understandings of sexual 
assault,13 added pressure has been placed on fact-finding in cases that hinge 
on credibility. The difficulty of fact-finding exists regardless of how consent 
 
9 A related observation acknowledges that “law and culture reciprocally influence 
understandings of what is and is not the crime of rape.” Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 
11 LAW & PHIL. 127, 132 (1992). 
10 For an early critique of the stranger rape paradigm, see Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 
1087 (1986). Estrich writes: 
At one end of the spectrum is the “real” rape, what I will call the traditional rape: A stranger 
puts a gun to the head of his victim, threatens to kill her or beats her, and then engages in 
intercourse. In that case, the law—judges, statutes, prosecutors and all—generally 
acknowledge that a serious crime has been committed. But most cases deviate in one or 
many respects from this clear picture, making interpretation far more complex. Where less 
force is used or no other physical injury is inflicted, where threats are inarticulate, where 
the two know each other, where the setting is not an alley but a bedroom, where the 
initial contact was not a kidnapping but a date, where the woman says no but does not 
fight, the understanding is different. In such cases, the law, as reflected in the opinions 
of the courts, the interpretation, if not the words, of the statutes, and the decisions of 
those within the criminal justice system, often tell us that no crime has taken place and 
that fault, if any is to be recognized, belongs with the woman. 
Id. at 1092. 
11 See id. at 1161 (“The available data suggest that while violent, stranger rape may be among 
the most frequently reported crimes in this country, the non-traditional rape—the case involving 
non-strangers, less force, no beatings, no weapons—may be among the least frequently reported, 
even when its victims perceive it to be ‘rape.’”). Further, “[i]n many if not most of these cases, forced 
sex is tolerated by its victims as unavoidable, if not ‘normal.’” Id. Of women victimized by rape, half 
are raped by an intimate partner and forty percent by an acquaintance. NISVS, supra note 1, at 21. 
12 See Michelle Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform, 125 YALE 
L.J. 1940, 1950-53 (2016) (describing decades long efforts to abolish the force requirement and 
concluding that “[d]espite some continued resistance to the criminalization of nonconsensual sex, 
the tide on the question appears to be shifting”). 
13 See Myka Held & Juliana McLaughlin, Rape and Sexual Assault, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 
155, 157-59 (2014) (discussing states’ use of the terms “sexual assault” and “rape,” sometimes 
interchangeably, and the various, often synonymous, definitions of both terms). As is typical, I use 
the terms interchangeably unless a more particular meaning is specified. 
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is defined,14 but controversy over affirmative consent15 has increased the 
salience of factual discrepancies while also activating the widespread 
perception that word-on-word (normally “he said/she said”) cases are not 
provable. For this reason, credibility discounting threatens to stall progress 
toward modernizing rape law.16 
Credibility discounting in the criminal justice system also hampers ongoing 
work in the campus sexual assault setting. Rather than focusing on colleges’ 
obligation to provide an educational environment that allows all students, 
regardless of gender, to learn and thrive,17 policymakers are essentially asking 
administrators to fill a void created by a dysfunctional criminal legal process.18 
While understandable, this impulse to work around the criminal justice 
system19 is ultimately doomed to failure. Institutions of higher education 
cannot substitute for the criminal justice system, but the bias perceived as 
endemic to criminal justice outcomes encourages resort to this alternative. 
Bias is not confined to the criminal justice system, of course, and campus 
adjudication requires university officials to assess credibility. Word-on-word 
scenarios are even more commonplace in the university setting (as compared 
to the criminal justice arena) because college disciplinary procedures lack 
compulsory mechanisms for obtaining corroborating evidence.20 Without the 
 
14 For example, whether “no means no” or “yes means yes.” Affirmative consent rules do not 
tend to alter the likelihood of factual discrepancies arising, although they may increase the odds of 
interpretative variation between the parties about what constitutes a “yes” to sexual activity. See 
generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441 (2016). For a study 
of interpretive variance in rape adjudication, see generally Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition and 
Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (2010). 
15 See Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 14 (analyzing various arguments against 
affirmative consent rules). While affirmative consent standards have ascended in the university 
setting, there remains considerable resistance to their adoption in a criminal code. Id. at 443. 
16 For a normative defense of modernizing rape law, see generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, Sex 
Without Consent, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335 (2013). 
17 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Reforming Rape Policies on Campus, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/education/reforming-rape-policies-on-campus.html [https://
perma.cc/QYM4-CAY5] (arguing that universities are failing in their obligation to protect students 
and facilitate learning). 
18 See Diana Moskovitz, Why Title IX Has Failed Everyone on Campus Rape, DEADSPIN (July 7, 
2016, 2:58 PM), http://deadspin.com/why-title-ix-has-failed-everyone-on-campus-rape-1765565925 
[https://perma.cc/WSU5-7NUT] (“Ideally, the criminal justice system and Title IX would work along 
parallel but separate tracks, with the police investigating to determine whether a crime happened and 
the university doing what it has to do to keep students safe and ensure their rights to an education.”). 
19 See Bernice Yeung, A Problem of Evidence, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 14, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bernice-yeung/sexual-assault-rape_b_3917144.html [https://perma.cc/
VLR4-LXGE] (describing another effort to bypass a faulty criminal justice system using federal civil 
rights law). However, despite “dozens of federal sexual harassment cases [brought by the U.S. Equal 
Opportunity Employment Commission] involving farmworkers who claimed that they had been 
assaulted or raped on the job,” not one criminal prosecution resulted. Id. 
20 See infra notes 42–47, 53 and accompanying text (discussing types of corroborative evidence 
that are often available in rape and sexual assault cases). 
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benefit of search warrants, subpoenas, and grand jury investigations, 
administrators frequently rely in full on the parties’ accounts of what 
occurred. When these accounts diverge, as is typical, credibility discounting 
threatens to impair the integrity of campus proceedings. 
Identifying this dynamic enables a more nuanced approach to the design 
of college disciplinary procedures. For instance, one way of making sense of 
the preponderance of evidence standard—the standard that, although 
controversial,21 has now been adopted by most universities22—is that it 
represents an attempt to compensate for longstanding and continuing 
credibility discounts assigned to women alleging rape on campus.23 Measures 
to target these discounts directly,24 if effective, might ultimately shift the 
calculus regarding the appropriate burden of proof. 
As this portrayal of legal and policy flux suggests, we are at a liminal moment 
for sexual assault reform both on and off campus. Because credibility discounting 
has the potential to thwart the evolution of sound laws and procedures regarding 
rape, exposing the phenomenon assumes particular urgency. 
This Article provides a first conceptual analysis of the systemic 
discounting of rape accusers’ credibility.25 It does so by situating prejudiced 
disbelief as a separate failure of justice, one itself deserving of consideration. 
Only by attending to this failure of justice on its own terms can we begin to 
 
21 See Conor Friedersdorf, What Should the Standard of Proof Be in Campus Rape Cases?, ATLANTIC 
(June 17, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/campuses-sexual-misconduct/487505 
[https://perma.cc/CX72-GFMX] (summarizing objections to the preponderance of the evidence 
standard); see also Anderson, supra note 12, at 1984-90 (responding to criticisms of the standard). 
22 Friedersdorf, supra note 21 (noting that most universities have adopted a preponderance 
standard to comply with the directive contained in the Department of Education’s 2011 Dear 
Colleague Letter). 
23 See Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 
to Senator James Lankford, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Regulatory Affairs & Fed. Mgmt. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs (Feb. 17, 2016), http://chronicle.com/items/biz/
pdf/DEPT.%20of%20EDUCATION%20RESPONSE%20TO%20LANKFORD%20LETTER%20
2-17-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP3E-DUST] (defending the preponderance of evidence standard at 
educational institutions, and requiring that institutions adopt “‘grievance procedures providing for 
prompt and equitable resolution’ of complaints”). Such requirements arguably aim to correct for 
systemic credibility discounting. A fuller analysis of the pros and cons of the 2011 Department of 
Education guidance is beyond the scope of this discussion. 
24 Similar measures are emerging in the law enforcement context. See infra note 309 and 
accompanying text. 
25 This analysis advances a conversation about how best to ensure that credibility is judged in a way 
that does not perpetuate inequality. In a world without credibility discounts, a given allegation may be 
false; an allegation may not be credible; and a credible allegation may not rise to the requisite level of 
proof. These possibilities would remain, but without the same implications for epistemic injustice. 
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fathom the full harm to victims26—quite apart from downstream effects on 
criminal justice outcomes.27 
The analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I begins by elaborating on the 
centrality of credibility assessment to the processing of rape allegations. 
Although the availability of corroborative evidence complicates conventional 
accounts of the “he said/she said” model, unwarranted disbelief nonetheless 
undermines effective investigation and accurate adjudication. After 
describing this dynamic, the discussion disaggregates the construct of 
credibility. It then introduces the concept of discounting. 
Part II documents the phenomenon of credibility discounting. 
Throughout history, rape law formally embedded deep skepticism of sexual 
assault allegations. The systemic disregard of rape victims was accomplished 
through a set of unique legal requirements—corroboration,28 prompt outcry,29 
and cautionary jury instructions30—along with a special defense to rape for a 
victim’s “social companion.”31 While much of this legal regime has been 
dismantled, credibility discounts have endured by relocating to the realm of 
law enforcement practice.32 
Part III provides an epistemological account of credibility discounts that 
casts new light on the processing of rape allegations. A main contribution in 
this regard is to transplant the philosophical idea of epistemic injustice to 
legal scholarship. Epistemic injustice encompasses both the injustice of 
disbelief (testimonial injustice), which entails the downgrading of a speaker’s 
perceived trustworthiness due to prejudice,33 and the injustice of 
misinterpretation (hermeneutical injustice), which prevents a person from 
making sense of her experience and protesting it in comprehensible form.34 
Each category of epistemic injustice flows from structural inequalities; each 
results in a primary harm and a further cascade of harms; and each pervades 
the criminal justice system’s treatment of rape. 
Part IV situates credibility discounting within law, arguing for its 
recognition, under delineated circumstances, as actionable discrimination. 
Without needing to resort to a new cause of action, I urge the application of 
existing anti-discrimination frameworks to the systemic provision of 
 
26 See infra notes 260–75; 290–92 and accompanying text (describing the “primary harm” 
inflicted on the victim in her capacity as a knower). 
27 Although not my focus here, it is worth highlighting the inverse relationship between 
credibility discounting and accurate factfinding. 
28 See infra notes 113–17 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 118–19 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra Section II.B. 
33 See infra notes 246–75 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 276–99 and accompanying text. 
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credibility discounts. To ground this proposal, I sketch a new equal protection 
claim—a claim premised on the insight that, when rape victims confront a 
law enforcement regime predisposed to dismiss their complaints, they are 
effectively denied the protective resources of the state. 
This Article concludes by drawing attention to the political dimensions of 
epistemic justice and their bearing on equality norms. Because, as a general 
proposition, those who are epistemically disempowered are prone to suffering 
unremedied injuries, cognizing the harm of epistemic injustice holds real 
promise even beyond the realm of sexual violence.35 
I. INCREDIBLE WOMEN 
When a listener is called upon to evaluate the truthfulness of a woman’s 
account of rape, the listener inevitably draws upon a store of existing beliefs 
about rape complainants. This set of assumptions may vary by person, of 
course. Yet if we focus on the listeners most often situated in evaluative 
positions vis-a-vis accusations of sexual violence, certain patterns emerge. By 
attending to police and prosecutors in particular, we may discern a widely 
shared set of background assumptions about women who allege rape. These 
assumptions lead law enforcement officers to disregard truthful allegations, 
not simply because rape and its impact on victims are misunderstood, but also 
because the incidence of false reporting is substantially overestimated.36 
 
35 See infra notes 331–33 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 81–106 and accompanying text. Errors regarding the likelihood of a false 
report may be compounded by underestimations of the actual incidence of rape, which is strikingly 
high. A 2010 National Intimate Partner Survey found that nearly one in five women (18.3 percent) 
reported having experienced rape, which was defined as any completed or attempted unwanted vaginal 
(for women), oral, or anal penetration using physical force or threats of physical harm, in addition to 
penetration when a victim was drunk, high, drugged, or passed out and unable to consent. NISVS, 
supra note 1, at 18. In addition, 44.6 percent of women reported having experienced other forms of 
sexual violence, including sexual coercion and unwanted sexual conduct. Id. Recent studies of sexual 
assault on college campuses indicate that 10.8 percent of female undergraduates have experienced sexual 
penetration by force or incapacitation. DAVID CANTOR ET AL., REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS 
CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 14 (Sept. 21, 2015).  
Surveys that rely on a broader definition of sexual assault that includes forced kissing and 
fondling have proven controversial. See Jake New, One in Five?, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Dec. 15, 2014), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/12/15/critics-advocates-doubt-oft-cited-campus-sexual-
assault-statistic [https://perma.cc/AN22-N22D] (describing criticism of the National Institute of 
Justice’s 2007 Campus Sexual Assault Study for its “broad definition of sexual assault” and that 
“some argue that an unwanted kiss should not be conflated with other kinds of more severe sexual 
assault or rape”). Applying this definition, nearly one in five college women report have been 
sexually assaulted; for men, the figure is one in seventy-one. NISVS, supra note 1, at 1; see also 
CHRISTOPHER KREBS ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 
SERIES, CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY VALIDATION STUDY FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT 73-74 (Jan. 
2016), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ccsvsftr.pdf [https://perma.cc/48FC-RQK2] (reporting 
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Recurring tropes of disbelief center on three possibilities: the rape accuser 
is malicious or vindictive and therefore lying about her rape;37 she is regretful 
about consenting to sexual activity with the accused and therefore lying about 
her rape; or she is incapable of assessing whether she consented due to 
intoxication, and therefore lying when she claims otherwise. Although a rape 
accuser is occasionally perceived as offering a truthful account, she may 
nevertheless be deemed unworthy of the law’s protection, either because she 
is seen as inviting her violation38 or as exaggerating the extent of her injury.39 
Identifying this constellation of presumptions illuminates the influence of what 
I will call the “paradigmatic rape accuser” on the credibility assessments of police 
and prosecutors. Focus on this constellation also reveals the hold this accuser 
maintains on the legal rules created to inoculate against her lies and exaggerations.40 
Before developing these observations, however, it is useful to expand 
upon three underlying concepts: the centrality of credibility, the components 
of credibility, and the meaning of discounting. 
A. The Centrality of Credibility 
Modern day sexual assault cases, which tend to hinge on questions of 
consent,41 are commonly perceived as “he said/she said” or “word-on-word” 
contests. Yet this understanding is reductionist, for it overlooks the pivotal 
role of corroborative evidence. Corroborative evidence—i.e., evidence that 
tends to support one party’s version of events42—can include electronic 
 
that, among 23,000 undergraduates surveyed, 21 percent of female students said that they had been 
sexually assaulted while in college, while 7 percent of male students said the same). 
37 In non-stranger rape cases, the relationship between accuser and accused is thought to 
motivate the impulse to falsely allege a crime. But see infra notes 103–05 (suggesting that false 
allegations, when they occur, arise more often regarding strangers than non-strangers). 
38 This trope rests on two slightly different misunderstandings. One is that, by behaving in a 
certain manner, the complainant impliedly consented to intercourse. The other is that a woman 
considered to have “asked for it” has waived her right to withhold consent. I am grateful to Sherry 
Colb for articulating this latter formulation. 
39 This often arises in cases involving previous consensual sex between the accuser and accused. 
See infra notes 204–208 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra Section II.A. 
41 Cf. supra notes 10–16 and accompanying text. 
42 See, e.g., MISSOULA CTY. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT POLICY & 
PROCEDURE MANUAL 123-27 (2014), https://dojmt.gov/wp-content/uploads/SEXUAL-ASSAULT-
POLICY-AND-PROCEDURE-MANUAL.pdf [HTTPS://PERMA.CC/ERW4-LUC8] (explaining 
that corroborating evidence can include physical evidence, outcry witnesses, eyewitnesses, 
surveillance recordings, medical evidence, the defendants’ testimony, texts, and phone calls); MASS. 
DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, MASSACHUSETTS PROSECUTOR’S MANUAL: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
& SEXUAL ASSAULT 177-78 (July 2010), www.mass.gov/mdaa/docs/dv-sa-manual-7-10.doc [https://
perma.cc/E3WM-Q9MJ] (describing types of corroborative evidence, including computer records 
and other electronic evidence, tapes of 911 telephone calls, surveillance tapes, photos of the victim, 
crime scene, and defendant, forensic evidence, the victim’s excited utterances, and eyewitnesses); 
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evidence like text messages, voicemails, photographs or social media posts,43 
forensic reports,44 witnesses to the lead-up or aftermath,45 and, on rare 
occasions, eyewitnesses to the incident.46 In addition to evidence that 
supports a victim’s account by tending to confirm specific factual assertions, 
expert testimony that dispels rape myths can also be considered a type of 
corroborative evidence.47 A more holistic approach contemplates the 
potential availability of corroboration, which—if properly gathered—obviates 
the need to pit word against word. This more complicated depiction of how 
 
WIS. OFFICE OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, WISCONSIN PROSECUTOR’S SEXUAL ASSAULT 
REFERENCE BOOK 42 (Oct. 2009), https://www.wcasa.org/file_open.php?id=3 [https://perma.cc/
N8Q3-CWE9] (mentioning areas of potential corroboration, including the victim’s post-assault 
behavior and forensic evidence obtained by a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner); ILL. LAW ENF’T 
TRAINING & STANDARDS BD., MODEL GUIDELINES & SEX CRIMES INVESTIGATION TRAINING 
MANUAL FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 102-04 (May 1996), https://iletsbei.com/docs/publications/
sexassualt.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6V4-2HAV] (stating that potential corroboration includes 
medical evidence, the defendant’s statements, and eyewitnesses). 
43 See, e.g., Juliet Macur & Nate Schweber, Rape Case Unfolds on Web and Splits City, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/sports/high-school-football-rape-case-unfolds-
online-and-divides-steubenville-ohio.html [https://perma.cc/JEQ5-S8SA] (noting the impact of social 
media on sexual assault allegations against a high school football team, “when teenagers are capturing 
much of their lives on their camera phones—even repugnant, possibly criminal behavior, as they did in 
Steubenville in August—and then posting it on the Web, like a graphic, public diary”); Tyler Bishop, 
Graphic Evidence Introduced in Rape Trial, VANDERBILT HUSTLER (Jan. 17, 2015), http://www.
vanderbilthustlerarchives.com/news/safety/article_f4cad6a0-9e67-11e4-9e55-5baca2611b4b.html [https://
perma.cc/NG4F-6G8E] (describing admission of “graphic photo and video evidence from the phones of 
the accused in the rape case against four former Vanderbilt football players”); Lizzie Crocker, Was it Sex 
or Rape at St. Paul’s?, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 26, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/26/was-
it-sex-or-rape-at-st-paul-s.html [https://perma.cc/6VMB-D23Y] (detailing how “prosecutors showed 
Facebook messages in May 2014 between [defendant] Labrie and another friend” to support their case). 
44 See, e.g., Adrienne LaFrance, What Makes the Stanford Rape Case So Unusual, ATLANTIC (June 
9, 2016) https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/what-makes-the-stanford-rape-case-
so-unusual/486374/ [https://perma.cc/3RCJ-29NE] (noting that prosecutors introduced forensic 
evidence that pine needles were found inside the victim’s vagina and toxicology reports showing 
victim’s extreme level of intoxication). 
45 See, e.g., JON KRAUKAUR, MISSOULA 138 (2015) (describing a case where the victim texted her 
housemate about the rape just after the rapist walked from the bedroom into an adjacent bathroom). 
46 See, e.g., Ema O’Connor, In Their Words: The Swedish Heroes Who Caught the Stanford Sexual 
Assailant, BUZZFEED (June 7, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/emaoconnor/meet-the-two-swedish-
men-who-caught-brock-turner?utm_term=.vbNj0m45Y#.cxjX7VAEa [https://perma.cc/6XJK-CV8B] 
(describing how two eyewitnesses to the sexual assault of an unconscious woman interrupted the attack 
and called the police); cf. Tyler Kingkade, Why Would Anyone Film a Rape and Not Try to Stop It? 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 23, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/why-film-a-rape_us_
5717b957e4b0c9244a7a8e07 [https://perma.cc/TBD8-PG3U] (“It sounds unimaginable: someone 
witnesses a friend being sexually assaulted, but instead of seeking help, they film it and post it on social 
media. But sadly, stories like this are more common than one would think.”). 
47 Prosecution manuals and resources often discuss the importance of using experts to correct 
such misimpressions and to educate juries about counter-intuitive conduct on the part of the victim. 
See, e.g., Teresa P. Scalzo, Overcoming the Consent Defense, 1 VOICE 1, 3 (2006) (asserting that expert 
witnesses can help to “explain behaviors a jury might not otherwise understand”). 
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rape allegations are processed reveals that, for several reasons, the construct 
of credibility remains critical to the legal response to sexual assault. 
First, law enforcement officers are presented at the outset with a 
complainant’s account of events; only after preliminarily evaluating this 
account do officers decide whether and how to proceed with an 
investigation.48 Yet often, as we will see, rape accusations are promptly 
disregarded, short-circuiting sexual assault investigations well before the 
opportunity to gather available corroborative evidence is exhausted.49 The 
prevalence of truncated police investigations suggests that threshold 
credibility determinations are often outcome determinative. 
Moreover, a rape victim’s willingness to report an incident to law 
enforcement (or, in the university setting, to college administrators) frequently 
turns on an appraisal of the probability that—as a starting proposition—she 
will be believed. While lacking a name for the phenomenon,50 survivors of 
sexual assault widely discern the pervasiveness of credibility discounting.51 
Consequently, before corroboration can possibly enter the mix, most survivors 
opt to keep their credibility from ever being judged.52 
Relatedly, the availability of corroborative evidence depends on the 
forum. The promise of corroboration has its greatest purchase in the criminal 
context, where police and prosecutors can obtain search warrants and harness 
the investigative power of the grand jury. Outside the criminal context, in 
contrast, corroboration is generally harder to come by.53 This reality restricts 
 
48 Initial impressions of a complainant’s credibility will tend to trigger what social 
psychologists have called the confirmation bias. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND 
SLOW 80-81 (2013) (noting that people “seek data that are likely to be compatible with beliefs they 
currently hold”). 
49 See infra notes 163–208 and accompanying text; see also Kathy Dobie, To Catch A Rapist, N.Y. 
TIMES MAGAZINE (Jan. 5, 2016) https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/10/magazine/to-catch-a-
rapist.html [https://perma.cc/4TU5-5F65] (“[T]he most current thinking on sexual-assault 
investigations is that there is always corroborating evidence. Detectives just have to be willing to 
search for it.”). 
50 See infra note 331 (noting the importance of creating a workable vocabulary to describe 
previously overlooked harm). 
51 As Katie Baker notes, “Sexual assault victims are ‘less likely to go to the police because they 
are so often unbelieved: The possibility of being ridiculed, doubted, shamed, or even thrown in jail 
dissuades many from coming forward.’” Katie J. Baker, The Police Told Her to Report Her Rape, Then 
Arrested Her for Lying, BUZZFEED (Sept. 27, 2015), https://www.buzzfeed.com/katiejmbaker/the-
police-told-her-to-report-her-rape-then-arrested-her-for [https://perma.cc/92TA-Q8QE]. See infra 
notes 152–158 and accompanying text. 
52 See infra notes 152–58 and accompanying text (describing the prevalence of underreporting). 
53 To be clear, this is not suggesting that it is impossible to obtain corroboration in non-
criminal proceedings. See Sarah Brown, “I Want to Get This Right”: Scenes from a Conference on Campus 
Sexual Assault, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (July 25, 2016) (emphasizing the importance of 
investigators seeking corroborative evidence in campus investigations). 
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the evidence obtainable in campus disciplinary proceedings and in any other 
forum without compulsory process.54 
Last, even where a complainant’s allegations are corroborated, her 
credibility will always matter. This observation is likely intuitive, but a few 
underlying points are worth noting. Corroboration, which tends to bolster a 
particular version of events, comes in degrees of power—from nearly 
definitive to extremely ambiguous.55 Given this spectrum, in consent cases 
the probative force of corroborative evidence will almost invariably56 be 
dwarfed in importance by a victim’s description of what transpired.57 
 
54 The workplace is another context in which obtaining corroborating evidence is often especially 
difficult. See William R. Tamanyo, Sexual Harassment and Assault in the Workplace: A Basic Guide for 
Attorneys in Obtaining Relief for Victims under Federal Employment Law, NAT’L IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S 
ADVOC. PROJECT 6, 10 (2013), http://library.niwap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/pdf/CULT-Man-
Ch18-GuideObtainingReliefUnderFedEmploymentLaw-07.10.13.pdf [https://perma.cc/VLY2-5E8K] 
(discussing reasons why witnesses may be fearful to come forward and describing procedures the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission should adopt to obtain evidence during its investigation). 
55 One example is the notorious 2012 Columbia University rape case. There, Emma Sulkowicz 
alleged that Paul Nungesser, a friend and fellow student, held her down on his bed and violently 
raped her. In that case, seemingly friendly, even intimate, Facebook messages exchanged between 
Sulkowicz and Nungesser after the alleged sexual assault ultimately became public, raising questions 
(for some) about whether Sulkowicz’s interactions with the accused rapist were inconsistent with 
the behavior of a rape victim. For instance, two days after the alleged assault, Nungesser messaged 
Sulkowicz on Facebook about getting together, to which she responded “lol yusss . . . Also I feel like 
we need to have some real time where we can talk about life and thingz . . . because we still haven’t 
really had a paul-emma chill sesh since summmmerrr.” Cathy Young, Columbia Student: I Didn’t Rape 
Her, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/03/columbia-
student-i-didn-t-rape-her.html [https://perma.cc/RJ6Z-V5WM]. Several weeks later, Sulkowicz 
initiated Facebook contact with Nungesser, asking if he wanted to “hang out a little bit . . . whatever 
I want to see yoyououoyou.” Id. The following week, Nungesser messaged Sulkowicz on her birthday, 
to which she responded the next morning with, “I love you Paul. Where are you?!?!?!?!” Id. When 
asked to describe what motivated her messages, Sulkowicz generally explained, “Paul was one of my 
closest friends freshman year. We’d had consensual sex twice. We were so close that we would say, ‘I 
love you,’ and we would confide in each other about our love lives.” Erin Gloria Ryan, How to Make 
an Accused Rapist Look Good, JEZEBEL (Feb. 6, 2015), http://jezebel.com/how-to-make-an-accused-
rapist-look-good-1682583526 [https://perma.cc/ER4C-MKZ9]. Sulkowicz offered a detailed account 
of why she sent the messages. For instance, when Nungesser messaged her about coming to a party 
two days after the assault and Sulkowicz responded affirmatively and said they should talk “about 
life and thingz,” she hadn’t “faced him since he assaulted [her], and [she] want[ed] to talk with him 
about what happened;” she “tried to say this in a friendly tone, so that he [wouldn’t] get scared;” she 
didn’t “want him to avoid the conversation.” Id. In retrospect, Sulkowicz described her conduct as 
“irrational, thinking that talking with [Nungesser] would help [her].” Id. Evidence of this sort is 
ambiguous, although expert testimony on the aftermath of rape can be useful in interpreting such 
exchanges. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
56 One prime exception is for filmed assaults, which seem to surface with surprising frequency. 
See Kingkade, supra note 46 (suggesting that reasons for this include the bystander effect, which is 
“particularly pronounced in teens and young adults” and “competitive attitudes on social media, 
where some engage in a culture of one-upping their friends”). 
57 See generally Ronald J. Allen & Alex Stein, Evidence, Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 55 
ARIZ. L. REV. 557 (2013). As Allen and Stein explain, factfinders “[c]onsider the parties’ competing 
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Moreover, those charged with determining the facts will tend to interpret the 
significance of corroborative evidence in light of their initial assessment of 
complainant credibility.58 
In short, the potential for corroboration does not alter the profound 
significance of credibility evaluations in rape cases. 
B. Components of Credibility 
A speaker who offers a factual claim—in philosophical parlance, a 
“testifier”—will likely be believed if she is considered trustworthy and her 
report deemed plausible.59 Each component of credibility, although often 
conflated in practice,60 should be considered separately. 
The first factor—trustworthiness—is perhaps most salient to our credibility 
determinations. Put simply, to accept the testifier’s version of events, “we stake 
our bets on the trustworthiness of the testifier.”61 Assessments of this sort are 
very much rooted in the context of a given report.62 Consider, as just one 
example from the policing context, that a woman’s trustworthiness might well 
be evaluated differently depending on whether she is reporting a rape or a 
robbery. As we will see, trustworthiness valuations can derive from evidence or 
from prejudice; when they result from the latter, the resulting downgrading of 
credibility raises concerns for epistemic injustice.63 
The perceived plausibility of an account—the second foundation of 
credibility—is similarly grounded in a listener’s preexisting belief structures, 
which are often problematic. For instance, in the sexual assault context, 
preconceived notions of how a rape victim behaves or how rape is perpetrated, 
 
stories and decide which is superior; in some cases, they construct their own account of the events 
in light of the parties’ evidence and arguments.” Id. at 568. 
58 See infra notes 66–69 and accompanying text (discussing the downgrading of plausibility based 
on perceived low trustworthiness). This dynamic accords with the confirmation bias. See supra note 48. 
59 See Karen Jones, The Politics of Credibility, in A MIND OF ONE’S OWN: FEMINIST ESSAYS 
ON REASON AND OBJECTIVITY 154-55 (Louise Antony & Charlotte Witt eds., 2002). Jones writes: 
“It is a commonplace that the credibility we ascribe to reports should be a function of the 
trustworthiness of the testifier, or testifiers, and the plausibility of what they say in the light of what 
else we believe.” Id. at 155. Adopting Lockean terminology, Jones identifies trustworthiness and 
plausibility as the two “foundations” or “grounds” of credibility. Id. (citing JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY 
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 663 (1689)). 
60 See infra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. 
61 Jones, supra note 59, at 156. 
62 See id. (“However, the trustworthiness we bet on need not be global; what we care about is 
local, namely, trustworthiness with respect to this exchange of information . . . .”). 
63 See Jennifer Lackey, Norms of Credibility 1 (Aug. 3, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author) (“What is taken to lie at the heart of testimonial injustice is that it stems entirely from 
receiving a credibility deficit—being treated as less worthy of belief or trust than the evidence 
suggests.”); see also infra notes 248–257 and accompanying text (discussing concerns for epistemic 
justice when trustworthiness valuations stem from prejudice). 
14 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 166: 1 
however inaccurate, inevitably inform a listener’s assessment of whether an 
accusation is plausible.64 When evaluated against a store of misinformation about 
how the world operates, truthful reports seem strange or even bizarre. 
In short, each component of credibility—trustworthiness and plausibility—raises 
distinct epistemic dangers. 
C. Discounting: An Overview 
A listener engages in credibility discounting when, based upon a faulty 
preconception, he reduces a speaker’s perceived trustworthiness or 
diminishes the plausibility of her account. I will later describe in depth how 
police officers and prosecutors discount the credibility of rape complainants.65 
For now, a general overview of the practice will suffice. 
As we have already seen, inquiries into both trustworthiness and 
plausibility raise concerns about prejudice. But these hazards are aggravated 
by a tendency on the part of listeners to conflate trustworthiness and 
plausibility.66 As philosopher Karen Jones explains, “Testifiers who belong to 
‘suspect’ social groups and who are bearers of strange tales can thus suffer a 
double disadvantage. They risk being doubly deauthorized as knowers on 
account of who they are and what they claim to know.”67 The consequences of 
this “double discounting,” so to speak, are severe: 
Distrust puts in place a suspicious cognitive set that colors how we will interpret 
the words of another. It leads us to look for signs of deception, irrationality, or 
incompetence and thus leads us to seek out evidence of inconsistencies, to 
magnify those we suppose ourselves to have found, and to focus on them in our 
assessment of the story as a whole. It also leads us to overlook the ways in which 
any inconsistencies that we take ourselves to have found can be explained away. 
Thus a low initial trustworthiness rating, if not insulated from affecting the 
assessment of the prior probability of the report, can give rise to runaway 
reductions in the probability assigned to a witness’s story.68 
 
64 See infra notes 232–38 and accompanying text (identifying this dynamic in prosecutorial 
decisionmaking). 
65 See infra Section II.B. 
66 See also infra notes 293–99 and accompanying text (discussing Fricker’s framework for 
understanding this phenomenon). 
67 Jones, supra note 59, at 158. Jones further suggests that “[i]f we operate with norms of 
credibility that do not take into account the influence of background beliefs and of prejudice on our 
credibility judgments, there is a very real risk of committing epistemic injustice.” Id. 
68 Id. at 159. The effect also runs in the opposite direction—“assessments of low plausibility, 
when permitted to infect assessments of trustworthiness, can lead to a two-way mutually reinforcing 
loop.” Id. at 160. 
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As Jones concludes, “When we violate the rule for the independence of 
assessments of trustworthiness and of plausibility, there is little the doubly 
epistemically disadvantaged can do to persuade us—we make it impossible 
for them to convince us by words of the truth of what they say.”69 
We can further refine this explanation of credibility discounting in two 
ways. First, while there is some disagreement about whether credibility is a 
finite good, under certain circumstances—notably the word-on-word case—a 
determination that one party is worthy of belief requires a judgment that the 
other is not.70 This scenario raises the prospect that one party might be 
afforded greater credibility than is warranted by the evidence.71 Consider that 
where A accuses B of raping her and B denies doing so, a prejudiced listener’s 
credibility determination might assume one of three of forms: A is 
downgraded and B is upgraded; A is downgraded and B is properly assessed; 
A is properly assessed and B is upgraded.72 All of these possibilities fall under 
the rubric of credibility discounting as I employ the term.73 
To further complicate the picture, credibility estimations fall along a 
continuum of belief.74 This suggests that discounting is not an all or nothing 
 
69 Id. 
70 Jennifer Lackey refers to this as a “credibility clash,” where “[s]omebody is telling the truth 
and somebody else is lying, and to say where the truth falls is ipso facto to point the finger of falsehood 
at the other.” Lackey, supra note 63, at 2-3. 
71 Lackey calls this a “credibility surplus.” Id. at 1. For example, a person accused of rape may 
be believed when he disputes the allegation “without regard for the fact that people accused of sexual 
assault often lie in denying the charge.” Id. at 2; see also Jose Medina, The Relevance of Credibility 
Excess in a Proportional View of Epistemic Injustice: Differential Epistemic Authority and the Social 
Imaginary, 25 SOC. EPISTEMOLOGY 15, 17 (2011) (“To the extent that an excessive attribution of 
credibility belongs to a chain of attributions that promotes epistemic vices, that attribution 
contributes to epistemic injustice.”). 
72 It is also possible that the credibility of both parties is assessed without resort to prejudice 
and still the listener disbelieves the account. This scenario does not implicate epistemic injustice. 
See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
73 Cf. Lackey, supra note 63, at 14 (arguing that “credibility assessments need to be understood 
relationally: whether my credibility assessment of you is just—epistemically and morally—can only be 
characterized in relation to my assessments of other members of the relevant context or community”). 
74 Richard Foley, Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis, DEGREES BELIEF 37 (Franz Huber 
& Christoph Schmidt-Petri eds., 2009) (“[B]elief talk is but a general way of classifying an individual’s 
confidence in a proposition.”). Philosophers have advanced considerable efforts to understand the degree 
of confidence that is sufficient for belief. This inquiry is usefully framed as follows: 
What propositions are rational for one to believe? With what confidence is it rational 
for one to believe these propositions? Answering the first of these questions requires 
an epistemology of beliefs, answering the second an epistemology of degrees of belief 
. . . . The two accounts would seem to be close cousins. An account of rational degrees 
of belief simply takes a more fine-grained approach than does an account of rational 
beliefs. The latter classifies belief-like attitudes into a threefold scheme of believing, 
disbelieving, and withholding judgment, whereas the former introduces as many 
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proposition; a speaker might receive a slight downgrading, a sizeable 
downgrading, or anywhere in between.75 
Acknowledging the existence of the credibility discount is not the same as 
insisting that all rape allegations are true.76 The problem that I identify here 
is a profound disconnect between perceptions of falsity and actual falsity.77 
Before we further probe this disconnect, ask yourself: what percentage of rape 
accusations reported to the police are false? In one survey of nearly nine 
hundred police officers, more than half of the respondents stated that ten to 
fifty percent of sexual assault complainants lie about being assaulted, while 
another ten percent of respondents asserted that the number of false reports 
is fify-one to hundred percent.78 Another study found that more than half of 
the detectives interviewed believed that forty to eighty percent of sexual 
assault complaints are false.79 This openly manifested skepticism largely 
explains the unusually high unfounding rates that characterize the police 
treatment of rape allegations.80 
 
distinctions as needed to talk about the levels of confidence one has in various 
propositions. 
Id. 
Ultimately, the “belief-talk” and the “degree-of-belief talk” may not be “fundamentally 
different. Both categorize one’s confidence in the truth of a proposition. Belief-talk does so in a less 
fine-grained and more vague way, but on the other hand vagueness may be just what is needed, given 
it is often not possible to specify the precise degree of confidence that someone has in a proposition.” 
Id.; see also Hans Rott, Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs, and Disbeliefs, DEGREES BELIEF 
301 (Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri eds., 2009) (“Beliefs can be thought of as being 
equipped with labels specifying their ‘certainty’, or, to use a different terminology, their 
‘entrenchment’ in a person’s belief state.”). 
75 Fricker acknowledges, “There will of course be a spectrum of cases spanning those in which 
the speaker’s credibility is only marginally deflated to those where it is drastically deflated, and also 
spanning cases where . . . it either is or isn’t sufficient to bring the level of credibility below the 
threshold for hearer acceptance.” Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Justice as a Condition of Political Freedom?, 
190 SYNTHESE 1317, 1319 (2013). 
76 See supra note 25; see also infra notes 86–101 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence 
of false rape allegations). 
77 The contours of this disconnect vary along multiple dimensions, such as gender, race, sexual 
orientation, and socioeconomic status. See infra note 175 and accompanying text. 
78 Amy Dellinger Page, Gateway to Reform? Policy Implications of Police Officers’ Attitudes Toward 
Rape, 33 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 44, 55 (2008). 
79 MARTIN D. SCHWARTZ, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE VISITING FELLOWSHIP: 
POLICE INVESTIGATION OF RAPE—ROADBLOCKS AND SOLUTIONS 28 (Dec. 2010). Less 
experienced detectives were more skeptical than those with greater experience; of those with more 
than eight years on the job, a majority estimated that the number of false reports was “low” or less 
than ten percent. Id. at 27; see also Emma Sleath & Ray Bull, Comparing Rape Victim and Perpetrator 
Blaming in a Police Officer Sample, 39 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 646, 648-49 (May 2012) (citing research 
demonstrating “a tendency on the part of the police to view rape victims’ behavior through a narrow 
perspective, with an approach that emphasizes suspicion and disbelief ”). 
80 See infra notes 159–78; see also The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, RAINN, https://rainn.org/get-
information/statistics/reporting-rates [https://perma.cc/L9LB-MDKP] (estimating, based on recent FBI 
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Research on false rape allegations suggests that such skepticism is 
unwarranted. Admittedly, studying the prevalence of false reports is difficult 
because of the methodological challenge of identifying ground truth—a 
difficulty that largely accounts for significant discrepancies in findings. As one 
researcher aptly summarized the problem, “significant adherence to rape myths 
by the public, media, jurors, and the criminal legal system makes it practically 
impossible to unravel the highly layered ‘truth’ about false rape allegations.”81 
One major limitation of the research is its frequent reliance on official law 
enforcement documents to classify an allegation as false.82 Equating a police 
determination that an accusation is “unfounded” with the falsity of that 
accusation results in the uncritical adoption of any and all credibility 
discounts meted out in the course of an investigation. Yet researchers often 
fail to note, much less to disentangle, this effect.83 Another common 
methodological flaw is to equate an accuser recanting with a false accusation. 
Since many factors may cause a truthful complainant to recant her allegation, 
a failure to independently assess the underlying accusation tends to result in 
 
and DOJ figures, that out of every 1000 rapes, 310 are reported to the police; only fifty-seven lead to 
an arrest); Alex Campbell & Katie J.M. Baker, Unfounded, BUZZFEED (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/alexcampbell/unfounded?utm_term=.kvpJlmmo2#.ih3qVXXkW 
[https://perma.cc/Z6KK-CZY3] (identifying eleven police departments with unfounding rates 
ranging from twenty-four to fifty-four percent). The clearance rates for sexual assault provided by 
the FBI Uniform Crime Report (UCR), a primary source of national criminal justice data, are 
unduly high. One important reason is that when “[a law enforcement] agency determines that 
complaints of crimes are unfounded or false, the agency eliminates that offense from its crime tally 
through an entry on the monthly report.” Methodology, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2015,  U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (2015), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/
resource-pages/2015-methodology_final [https://perma.cc/HUC2-ZWVX]. Because crimes categorized as 
unfounded are not used to determine UCR clearance rates, the frequency of unfounding sexual assault 
offenses greatly undermines the accuracy of the report. See JOANNE ARCHAMBAULT & KIMBERLY A. 
LONSWAY, CLEARANCE METHODS FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES, END VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 12-13 (May 2012) (discussing methodological issues underlying UCR reports). A separate 
problem with the UCR is that law enforcement agencies improperly use the “exceptional clearance” 
classification for rape cases, often because a victim is deemed “uncooperative.” Id. at 9. See generally 
Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie with Rape Statistics: America’s Hidden Rape Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
1197 (2014). 
81 Joanne Belknap, Rape: Too Hard to Report and Too Easy to Discredit Victims, 16 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 1335, 1336 (2010). 
82 See id. (critiquing a frequently cited study for relying on “official documents and reports of 
the police interviews” to classify a rape allegation as false). 
83 See, e.g., Jan Jordan, Beyond Belief? Police, Rape and Women’s Credibility, 4 CRIM. JUST. 29, 35-36 
(2004) (reporting within its study that “cases which the police said were false” contained both cases 
where the police report stated the complaint was considered to be false, and also those where the police 
“decided to halt investigating”); Eugene J. Kanin, False Rape Allegations, 23 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 
81-87 (1994) (“There is ample evidence . . . that in practice, unfounded rape can and does mean many 
things, with false allegation being only one of them, and sometimes the least of them.”). 
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findings of false reporting rates that are misleadingly high.84 In short, 
methodological shortcomings in this area are rampant.85 
The best available research on false allegations involves an independent 
evaluation of reports deemed unfounded by police.86 The prime example is a 
2012 study of a random sample of cases classified as unfounded by the Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) in a single year.87 For each of the eighty-
one cases investigated, researchers reviewed the complete police file, 
including the initial report prepared by the responding patrol officer, all 
follow-up reports from the assigned detective, and the detective’s reasons for 
classifying the report as unfounded.88 Researchers divided reports ultimately 
determined to be false89 into two categories: cases in which the complainant 
recanted and there was evidence to support a conclusion that a crime did not 
occur; and cases in which the complainant did not recant but there was 
“either evidence that the crime did not occur or no evidence that the crime 
did occur.”90 Of the eighty-one cases determined to be unfounded by police, 
fifty-five were deemed by researchers to have been false reports.91 After 
comparing this number to the total number of sexual assault complaints made 
 
84 See Belknap, supra note 81, at 1339-41; see also T. Christian Miller & Ken Armstrong, An 
Unbelievable Story of Rape, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/article/false-
rape-accusations-an-unbelievable-story [https://perma.cc/E7A2-GZGZ] (documenting police 
skepticism of a woman’s rape allegation, her subsequent recantation of her allegation, and the later 
apprehension and conviction of her rapist based on unequivocal evidence of his guilt). 
85 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text; see also David Lisak et al., False Allegations of 
Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten Years of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1324 
(2010) (discussing the research in LORENNE CLARK & DEBRA LEWIS, RAPE: THE PRICE OF 
COERCIVE SEXUALITY (1977), which conflated false reports made by an alleged victim and those 
filed by someone other than the victim). 
86 Research of this sort is highly labor intensive and has been rarely undertaken. 
87 CASSIA SPOHN & KATHARINE TELLIS, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, POLICING AND 
PROSECUTING SEXUAL ASSAULT IN LOS ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY: A COLLABORATIVE 
STUDY IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, AND THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S 
OFFICE 13-14 (Feb. 2012). 
88 Id. at 14-15. “The case files also included either verbatim accounts or summaries of 
statements made by the complainant, by witnesses (if any), and by the suspect (if the suspect was 
interviewed); a description of physical evidence recovered from the alleged crime scene, and the 
results of the physical exam (forensic medical sexual assault exam) of the victim (if the victim 
reported the crime within 72 hours of the alleged assault).” Id. at 15. 
89 A false report was defined as “a report of a sexual assault that did not happen.” Id. at 45. 
90 Id. at 45. “Regardless of whether the complainant recanted, [the researchers] looked for 
evidence that would support a conclusion that a crime did not occur: witness statements, video 
evidence, or physical evidence that clearly contradicted the complainant’s statement.” Id. at 46. 
91 Id. at 48. Of these fifty-five false reports, there were thirty-one cases in which the victim 
recanted and there was evidence that the crime did not occur, and twenty-four in which the victim 
did not recant but there was evidence that the crime did not occur or there was no evidence that the 
crime did occur. 
2017] Incredible Women 19 
to the LAPD that year, researchers calculated that 4.5 percent of all cases 
reported to the LAPD that year were false.92 
Another study that adopted a similar methodology is a 2010 review of all 
sexual assault cases reported to a major northeastern university over a ten-year 
period; the number of cases totaled 136.93 Defining a false claim as one in which 
a full investigation took place94 and the evidence showed by a preponderance 
that the reported sexual assault had not occurred, researchers found that only 
eight cases (5.9 percent) of the reported sexual assaults were false reports.95 In 
half of the allegations deemed by the research team to be false, the alleged 
victim ultimately admitted to fabricating some or all of their claims.96 
A different approach trains police officers to more accurately and precisely 
classify reports, then assesses the prevalence of allegations officers deem false. 
This methodology was employed by the only multistate study to evaluate the 
incidence of false reports.97 Law enforcement agencies in eight U.S. 
communities collected data for all sexual assault reports received over an 
eighteen to twenty-four month period (a total of 2059 cases). Participating 
agencies received training in how to properly classify sexual assault cases,98 
 
92 Id. at 49. Of this 4.5 percent, “2.2 percent were cases in which the complainant recanted and 
there was evidence that a crime did not occur and 2.3 percent were cases in which the complainant did 
not recant but there was evidence that a crime did not occur.” Id. Crucially, because the eighty-one 
unfounded cases were not a random sample of all cases reported to the LAPD in 2008, the ratio of 
false reports in the sample does not reflect the overall ratio. Therefore, to determine the percentage 
of false reports, researchers “used data that were weighted by the proportion of cases from each 
division and, within each division, the proportion of cases from each case closure type.” Id. They 
then extrapolated from the limited sample analyzed to the entire population of reported rapes and 
sexual assaults. Id. 
93 Lisak et al., supra note 85, at 1329. 
94 Id. at 1328. Full investigations included the police interviewing witnesses such as the alleged 
perpetrator, the victim, and others, and when applicable, the collection of forensic evidence such as 
medical records or security camera recordings. Id. 
95 Id. at 1318, 1329. 
96 Id. at 1329. In additional to conducting independent research, Lisak and his colleagues also 
reviewed studies spanning several decades regarding false sexual assault allegations from the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Although the estimated prevalence of false rape 
allegations varied between two percent and ten percent, many of the studies finding rates in the 
upper end of this range employed methodologies that were flawed. Id. at 1318, 1322-26. 
97 Kimberly A. Lonsway & Joanne Archambault, Understanding the Criminal Justice 
Response to Sexual Assault: Analysis of Data from the Making a Difference Project (2008) 
(unpublished study) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 
98 Possible classifications included “cleared by arrest” and “closed as an informational report 
(elements of a sexual assault offense not met).” Id. Importantly, another classification was 
“Unfounded/False (based on investigative findings that a crime did not occur, according to UCR 
[Uniform Crime Report] criteria),” which was defined to include only cases that were determined, 
based on evidence collected, to be false allegations. A separate classification, “Unfounded/Baseless 
(elements of the crime were not met, but not false, according to UCR criteria),” was created for 
cases that do not meet the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report criteria for a false report but where the 
events do not constitute a crime according to the state’s penal code. Id. 
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along with technical assistance to help ensure consistency and reliability.99 
These efforts were designed to reduce the effects of law enforcement biases. 
The study found a slightly higher incidence of false reports—140 of the 2,059 
cases (6.8 percent) were classified as such—as compared to research relying 
on an independent assessment of the allegations.100 
In sum, among these studies, which require a reasonably sound basis to 
believe that an allegation is false before classifying it accordingly, we see false 
reporting rates of 4.5 percent, 5.9 percent, and 6.8 percent.101 These figures are 
significantly lower than those provided by law enforcement officers when asked 
to estimate the incidence of false reporting.102 Moreover, research suggests that 
the kinds of cases most likely to be considered false—namely, those involving 
non-strangers and those involving intoxication—are in fact least likely to be 
false.103 Relatedly, commonplace assumptions on the part of law enforcement 
officers regarding rape accusers’ motivations104 are misguided; even in false 
reports, revenge, regret and guilt are not usually factors.105 
Law enforcement practices are steeped in misconceptions about the 
truthfulness of women alleging sexual assault.106 We now consider how 
pervasive skepticism is expressed in the meting out of credibility discounts. 
II. MAPPING THE CREDIBILITY DISCOUNT 
The legal response to rape has long been shaped by entrenched disbelief 
of women who level accusations of sexual assault. With one important 
 
99 Id. Moreover, researchers checked a random selection of cases for data entry errors. 
KIMBERLY A. LONSWAY, SUMMARY OF RESEARCH METHODS FOR “MAKING A DIFFERENCE” 
(MAD) PROJECT 4-5 (May 2012), http://www.evawintl.org/images/uploads/ResearchMethods.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B7WV-AH3H]. 
100 See supra notes 86–96 and accompanying text. 
101 See also Dara Lind, What We Know About False Rape Allegations, VOX 2 (June 1, 2015), 
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/1/8687479/lie-rape-statistics [https://perma.cc/PM8Q-XEE8] (“[R]esearch 
has finally nailed down a consistent range for how many reports of rape are false: somewhere between 2 
and 8 percent, which is a lot narrower than the 1.5 percent to 90 percent range of the past.”). 
102 See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text; see also infra Section II.B. 
103 Lind, supra note 101, at 2. 
104 See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (discussing paradigmatic rape accuser). 
105 Id.; cf. Max Ehrenfreund & Elahe Izadi, The Scientific Research Shows Reports of Rape are Often 
Murky, but Rarely False, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2014) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
wonk/wp/2014/12/11/the-scientific-research-shows-reports-of-rape-are-often-murky-but-rarely-false/
?utm_term=.4f21f1e2da17 [https://perma.cc/U7JJ-6CUP] (reporting on recent research studying rape, 
false accusations, and how the trauma of sexual assault affects a victim’s memory); Donna Zuckerberg, 
He Said, She Said: The Mythical History of the False Rape Allegation, JEZEBEL (July 30, 2015), 
http://jezebel.com/he-said-she-said-the-mythical-history-of-the-false-ra-1720945752 [https://perma.cc/
S6VD-JN6T] (discussing the ancient history of rape and the paradoxical tendency of cultures to fixate 
on false allegations despite the commonality of rape). 
106 See infra Section II.B. 
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exception—that is, for cases of white women alleging rape by black men107—the 
criminal justice system has generally treated rape complainants with incredulity. 
For much of American history, this distrust was openly baked into the law. 
Although modern reform efforts have mostly succeeded in abolishing formal 
rules of disbelief, the intuition behind these rules persists today, coalescing in 
an expansive enforcement gap. Scrutinizing the justificatory rhetoric 
underlying traditional legal doctrine enables us to track the migration of 
credibility discounts from formal legal process to law enforcement. In turn, 
tracing the origins of contemporary misgivings about rape allegations to 
repudiated legal structures provides purchase on why (and how) systemic 
incredulity endures. 
A. Incredulous Law 
American law has long embodied a stance of overt suspicion toward rape 
accusers. By examining both the common law and the Model Penal Code, we can 
disaggregate several related concerns about the woman alleging rape—specifically, 
her motivation to lie, her comparative fault in the rape, and the de minimis nature 
of her resulting injury. Our legal rules were designed to protect against this lying, 
inviting, exaggerating complainant—or the paradigmatic rape accuser, as I 
have described her.108 Her specter haunts rape law, from corroboration 
requirements,109 to prompt outcry rules,110 to cautionary jury instructions,111 to 
substantive definitions of crime and defense.112 
1. Corroboration Requirements, “Prompt Outcry” Rules, and 
Cautionary Jury Instructions 
To make the crime of rape more difficult to prove, a set of rules required 
(in various permutations) corroborative evidence of the alleged victim’s 
 
107 The criminal justice system’s longstanding response to this fact pattern was exemplified as 
follows by the judge in the infamous Scottsboro rape trial: 
Where the woman charged to have been raped, as in this case is a white woman there 
is a very strong presumption under the law that she would not and did not yield 
voluntarily to intercourse with the defendant, a Negro; and this is true, whatever the 
station in life the prosecutrix may occupy, whether she be the most despised, ignorant 
and abandoned woman of the community, or the spotless virgin and daughter of a 
prominent home of luxury and learning. 
DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 297 (1970). See generally 
Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 103 (1983). 
108 See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
109 See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. 
110 See infra notes 116–19 and accompanying text. 
111 See infra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
112 See infra notes 122–45 and accompanying text. 
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account, the alleged victim’s “prompt” disclosure of the incident, and jury 
instructions warning the jury about the danger of wrongly convicting the 
defendant.113 The history of these requirements is telling, as it reveals deeply 
ingrained doubts about the veracity of women alleging rape.114 
For instance, when New York first enacted a special corroboration 
requirement in 1886,115 it did so to shield defendants from “untruthful, dishonest, 
or vicious” accusers.116 Other states soon adopted this approach, including 
Georgia, whose Supreme Court proclaimed that “[w]ithout [a corroboration 
requirement], every man is in danger of being prosecuted and convicted on the 
testimony of a base woman in whose testimony there is no truth.” 117 
Likewise, the requirement of a “prompt complaint” rested on a 
presumptive distrust of rape allegations.118 Writing in 1900, the Utah 
Supreme Court equated delayed reporting with falsehood:  
 
113 Michelle Anderson has aptly described these doctrines as “adjacent bands in a spectrum of 
unique legal rules that made the crime of rape harder to prove than other felonies.” Michelle J. 
Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary 
Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. REV. 945, 953 (2004). The trio of rules have often 
been applied in relation to one another. 
For example, in many jurisdictions, if a woman failed to complain promptly, she would 
be forgiven if she had evidence corroborating the rape. If a woman suffered a rape that 
produced no corroborative evidence, a prompt complaint itself might serve as the 
necessary legal corroboration. A judge was frequently required to issue cautionary 
instructions in a rape case unless the complainant proffered corroborative evidence of 
the offense. Thus, in many jurisdictions, prompt complaint and corroboration substituted 
for one another with cautionary instructions only triggered by a complainant’s failure to 
either promptly complain or offer corroborative evidence of the crime. 
Id. at 954. 
114 My discussion of this history draws from Michelle Anderson’s comprehensive account. See id. 
115 Id. at 956. The corroboration requirement barred a conviction based exclusively on the 
testimony of a rape complainant by considering the case against the defendant legally insufficient 
without additional evidence of guilt. This requirement rested on the notion that a rape victim should 
be able to “display to honest men the injury done to her, the blood and her dress stained with blood, 
and the tearing of her dress.” HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS 
ANGILAE 483 (Sir Travers Twiss trans., 1879) (quoted in Anderson, supra note 113, at 947). 
116 Anderson, supra note 113, at 957 (quoting People v. Yannucci, 15 N.Y.S.2d 865, 866 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1939), rev’d on other grounds, 29 N.E.2d 185 (1940)). According to the language of the 
statute: “No conviction can be had for abduction, compulsory marriage, rape, or defilement upon 
the testimony of the female abducted, compelled or defiled, unsupported by other evidence.” See 
Anderson, supra note 113, at 956-57. 
117 Anderson, supra note 113, at 957 (quoting Davis v. States, 48 S.E. 180, 181-82 (Ga. 1904) 
(alteration in the original). 
118 This notion has deep roots in the Anglo-American tradition. As Henry de Bracton, a 
prominent thirteenth century English legal scholar, suggested, 
When therefore a virgin has been so deflowered and overpowered . . . forthwith and 
whilst the act is fresh, she ought repair with hue and cry to the neighbouring vills, and 
there display to honest men the injury done to her, the blood and her dress stained 
with blood, and the tearing of her dress, and so she ought to go to the provost of the 
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The natural instinct of a female thus outraged and injured prompts her to 
disclose the occurrence, at the earliest opportunity, to a relative or friend who 
naturally has the deepest interest in her welfare; and the absence of such 
disclosure tends to discredit her as a witness.119 
Perhaps the starkest expression of the law’s orientation toward rape 
accusers were jury instructions explicitly warning the jury to use special 
suspicion in evaluating the testimony of a rape complainant. Based on the 
seventeenth-century ruminations of Lord Hale,120 cautionary instructions 
sought to ensure jurors would remain particularly distrustful of the 
complainant’s version of events. In the parlance of one typical pattern 
instruction, since a rape charge “is one which is easily made and, once made, 
difficult to defend against, even if the person accused is innocent . . . the law 
requires that you examine the testimony of the female person named in the 
information with caution.”121   
The Model Penal Code (MPC), which includes a corroboration 
requirement, a rigid prompt outcry rule, and cautionary jury instructions, 
incorporates intense mistrust of rape complainants.122 Familiar rationales 
underlie the MPC’s skeptical stance toward allegations of sexual assault. In 
order to defend the exceptional requirement of corroboration,123 the 
 
hundred and to the serjeant of the lord the king, and to the coroners and to the 
viscount and make her appeal at the first county court . . . .” 
DE BRACTON, supra note 115, at 483 (quoted in Anderson, supra note 113, at 947). 
119 Anderson, supra note 113, at 955 (quoting State v. Neel, 60 P. 510, 511 (Utah 1900)). Anderson 
added that “[t]his sentiment remained prevalent until the early 1980s.” Id. 
120 For instance, Hale warned that if a rape accuser 
concealed the injury for any considerable time after she had opportunity to complain, 
if the place, where the fact was supposed to be committed, were near to inhabitants, 
or common recourse or passage of passengers, and she made no outcry when the fact 
was supposed to be done, when and where it is probable she might be heard by others; 
these and the like circumstances carry a strong presumption, that her testimony is 
false or feigned. 
SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 633 (1847). Hale also 
emphasized that a woman’s failure to promptly report the rape “always carries a presumption of a 
malicious prosecution.” Id. at 632. 
121 People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d 247, 253 (Cal. 1975); see also Hardin v. State, 840 A.2d 
1217, 1223-24 (Del. 2003) (similarly criticizing Lord Hale’s jury instruction). 
122 The Model Penal Code was approved in 1962; revisions to the provisions governing sexual 
assault began in 2012 for the first time. Project to Revise MPC Article 213 on Sexual Offenses Begins, 
ALI REPORTER 1 (Summer 2012), https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/2e/3c/2e3c57ef-ddfe-4efa-
acce-50d7594a39e9/2012-summer.pdf [https://perma.cc/QC6M-KDNA]. 
123 See Alex Stein, Inefficient Evidence, 66 ALA. L. REV. 423, 454 (2015). As Stein explains, 
our evidence law allows fact finders to convict a person of murder and many other 
serious crimes on the testimony of a single witness. All the fact finders need to do is 
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commentary cites “the difficulty of defending against false accusation of a sexual 
offense,” while explaining that “[t]he corroboration requirement is an attempt to 
skew resolution of [word-on-word] disputes in favor of the defendant.”124 To 
justify a hard prompt outcry rule,125 the commentary references a “vindictive 
complainant,” along with the “dangers of blackmail or psychopathy of the 
complainant.”126 And to rationalize an instruction that tells jurors “to evaluate the 
testimony of a victim . . . with special care,” the MPC relies on “the emotional 
involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with 
respect to alleged sexual activities carried out in private.”127 
The MPC provisions on sexual assault are currently undergoing long 
overdue revision.128 And most (though not all) jurisdictions have already 
 
believe that witness “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The “one witness” rule is the norm, 
while the corroboration requirements are properly viewed as exceptions to the norm. 
Id. 
Corroboration requirements for rape prosecutions can thus be juxtaposed with a stance of 
credulity towards witnesses in other criminal contexts, which reflects its own set of assumptions. 
For an argument that jurors are too willing to convict in cases involving uncorroborated eyewitness 
identification testimony, see Sandra Guerra Thompson, Beyond a Reasonable Doubt? Reconsidering 
Uncorroborated Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1523-42 (2008). 
124 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 cmt. at 428 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980). 
125 The rule precluded a prosecution unless the victim reported the crime to authorities within 
three months of the offense. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(4) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and 
Revised Comments 1980). 
126 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4 cmt. at 265 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
In 1980, the Model Penal Code’s commentary modified its defense of the prompt outcry 
requirement: 
The requirement of prompt complaint springs in part from a fear that unwanted 
pregnancy or bitterness at a relationship gone sour might convert a willing participant 
in sexual relations into a vindictive complainant. Barring prosecution if no report is 
made within a reasonable time is one way of guarding against such fabrication. Perhaps 
more importantly, the provision limits the opportunity for blackmailing another by 
threatening to bring a criminal charge of sexual aggression. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 cmt. at 421 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980). 
127 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
128 See supra note 122. 
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abolished formal rules of disbelief.129 Even so, as we will see,130 these same 
requirements are now imposed informally, yielding credibility discounts that 
are in many respects the functional equivalent of their legal predecessors. 
2. Substantive Definitions of Crime and Defense 
About two-thirds of the states still rely on the concept of force in 
criminalizing rape.131 Many jurisdictions expressly define rape as requiring 
physical force,132 a term that, for purposes of rape law, generally means more 
force than the force inherent in the act of intercourse.133 Other states define 
rape as sex without consent but include force as a component of non-
consent.134 In short, across the majority of states and in various guises, the 
force requirement endures. 
 
129 Early drafts of the proposed MPC revisions contain a useful overview of the state of the 
law on prompt complaint, corroboration, and cautionary instructions. AM. LAW INST., MODEL 
PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT NO. 5 184-89 
(Sept. 8, 2015). According to this summary, South Carolina is the only jurisdiction that retains a 
prompt outcry requirement, as applied exclusively to marital rape; Texas maintains a modified rule 
that is triggered by uncorroborated testimony. Id. at 185. Thirteen states continue to require 
corroboration, although these rules operate only in cases where “the testimony of the complaining 
witness is itself inherently contradictory or patently incredible, or where the complaining witness 
has recanted.” Id. at 186. Six states—Arkansas, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and West 
Virginia—and the federal courts allow the trial court to issue a cautionary instruction, in some cases 
only when the complainant’s testimony is uncorroborated. Id. at 187 n.31. 
130 See infra Section II.B. 
131 John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-Consent” 
Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 
1084-86 (2011).   
132 For states that include force in their statutory offense definition, see ALA. CODE § 13A-6-
61 (2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (2013); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 2013); CONN. GEN 
STAT. § 53a-70 (2014); D.C. CODE § 22-3002 (2013); FLA. STAT. § 794.011 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-6-1 (2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730 (2008) (using “strong compulsion” rather than force 
specifically); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.20 (2011); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-1 (2013); IOWA CODE 
§ 709.1 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503 (2013); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040 (West 2013); LA. 
STAT. ANN. § 42:1 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-a, § 253 (2016); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW 
§ 3-303 (West 2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22 (2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b (2014); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 566.030 (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (2009); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 
(McKinney 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (West 2008); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1114 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.375 (2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121 (2014); 
11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-2 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-
22-1 (2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (2013); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.040 (2013); W. VA. CODE 
§ 61-8B-3 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 940.225 (2013); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-302 (2013). 
133 See, e.g., State v. Jones, 299 P.3d 219, 228 (Idaho 2013) (defining “extrinsic force” as “anything 
beyond that which is inherent or incidental to the sexual act itself”). 
134 For states with consent definitions that include force, see ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.410 (2013); 
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.470(8) (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406 (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-1401(7) (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 773 (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 761 (2015); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 (2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1) (2012). 
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This requirement has been heavily critiqued135 and my purpose here is not 
to retread well-covered ground.136 Rather, I wish simply to observe that, 
among the many functions performed by a force standard,137 one is to serve 
as the ultimate corroboration requirement by insisting, as a matter of law, that 
an accuser’s testimony regarding her lack of consent be bolstered by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of a separate, more “objective” element.138 On this 
view, the traditional (and still prevalent) definition of rape embodies grave 
misgivings about a rape complainant’s say-so. 
This perspective finds resonance in the MPC, which defines rape by 
reference to force139 and justifies this treatment by tacitly invoking the 
paradigmatic accuser—her lying, inviting and exaggerating.140 As the 
commentary explains, 
Often the woman’s attitude may be deeply ambivalent. She may not want 
intercourse, may fear it, or may desire it but feel compelled to say “no.” Her 
confusion at the time of the act may later resolve into non-consent. Some 
have expressed the fear that a woman who subconsciously wanted to have 
sexual intercourse will later feel guilty and “cry rape.”141 
The same set of concerns lies behind the MPC’s recognition of a 
“Voluntary Social Companion” defense to rape.142 The defense codifies the 
view that, as compared to stranger rape or “real rape,”143 non-stranger rape is 
less violative and more (problematically) dependent on “subjective” forms of 
 
135 For decades, commentators have argued that rape should be defined by reference to an 
absence of consent. Indeed, “[v]irtually all modern rape scholars want to modify or abolish the force 
requirement as an element of rape.” David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 
322 (2000). 
136 For a seminal critique, see Estrich, supra note 10. For a taxonomy of cases where non-
consensual intercourse can be accomplished without sufficient force to satisfy the traditional 
definition of rape, see generally Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape On and Off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 
16-38 (2015). 
137 Cf. Estrich, supra note 10, at 1098-99 (“The requirement that sexual intercourse be 
accompanied by force or threat of force to constitute rape provides a man with some protection 
against mistakes to consent.”). 
138 See Anderson, supra note 113, at 948 (discussing the obligation of rape complainant to 
“display to honest men the injury done to her, the blood and her dress stained with blood, and the 
tearing of her dress” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
139 This is likely changing. See supra note 122. 
140 See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (elaborating on this construct). 
141 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 302-03 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980). 
142 The defense, which reduces Rape in the First Degree to Rape in the Second Degree, is 
unavailable where “the victim was not a voluntary social companion of the actor upon the occasion 
of the crime and had not previously permitted him sexual liberties.” MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 213.1(1). The Model Penal Code provisions on sexual assault, including § 213.1, are currently under 
revision. See supra note 122. 
143 See supra note 10. 
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evidence—namely, the testimony of an accuser. The commentary describes 
the rationale for the defense as follows: 
First, when previous sexual liberties have been allowed and the persons 
involved are voluntary companions on the occasion of the offense, the gravity 
of the wrong is arguably less severe. Second, the fact that the actor is a 
stranger to the victim, or the fact that sexual liberties have not been permitted 
in the past, is strong objective corroboration of the fact that the sexual act 
was accomplished by imposition. The criterion is thus consistent with the 
efforts of the Model Code to avoid making the imposition–consent inquiry 
entirely on a subjective basis and to seek objective indicia to support the 
necessary finding of compulsion.144 
This commentary reflects an understanding of the non-stranger rape 
accuser as not only less-than violated, but also less-than credible. 
In recent decades, progressive law reform has undone most rules that 
formally discount the credibility of rape accusers,145 and this trajectory 
continues.146 Yet, to this day, the logic of the forcible compulsion standard and 
of the Voluntary Social Companion defense influence how rape law is enforced. 
And the basic assumptions underlying the corroboration requirement, the 
“prompt outcry” rule, and cautionary jury instructions147 persist in new guises. 
We turn now to current incarnations of the credibility discount. 
B. Incredulous Law Enforcement 
In the field of law enforcement—where vast discretion is afforded to those 
charged with the investigation and prosecution of crime—wide-ranging 
impulses to downgrade the credibility of rape accusers find a capacious outlet. 
Informal practices quietly sustain a regime that disadvantages those seeking 
criminal justice redress for sexual violence, and serve as a substitute for the 
formally disavowed legal rules crafted to achieve this same end. 
In the policing arena, we can discern the appearance of the paradigmatic 
accuser, who—either in the alternative or in combination—invited the alleged 
rape, was not harmed by it, and did not in fact experience it.148 Again, disbelief 
stems from three possibilities: the complainant is malicious or vindictive; she 
 
144 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. at 307 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1980). 
145 No jurisdiction retains the Voluntary Social Companion defense. 
146 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
147 See supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra notes 37–40 (introducing the paradigmatic rape accuser). 
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is regretful about consenting to sexual activity with the accused; or she is 
incapable of assessing whether she consented due to intoxication.149 
Although false reports of rape are uncommon,150 law enforcement officers 
often default to incredulity when women allege sexual assault, resulting in 
curtailed investigations and infrequent arrests. Prosecutorial charging 
practices are less easily tracked, but evidence shows that credibility discounts 
are also imposed at this stage of the criminal process.151 Indeed the effects of 
systemic disbelief extend beyond the estimations of individual prosecutors: 
because prosecutors consider the likely reaction of jurors when evaluating 
whether to proceed with a case, personal credibility reductions are 
compounded by a calculus about the layperson’s biases. I will refer to this 
dynamic as anticipatory discounting. 
But first, we examine practices of credibility discounting in the policing 
of sexual assault. 
1.  Police 
A majority of sexual assault victims preempt the deployment of 
credibility discounts by declining to relate the crime’s occurrence to law 
enforcement officials.152 According to recent Justice Department estimates, 
the population most vulnerable to sexual assault—females ages 18-24153—report 
to police at rates of only twenty percent for college students and thirty-two 
percent for non-college students.154 Women of color, both on and off 
campus, may be even less likely to report sexual assault than their white 
 
149 Id. 
150 See supra notes 86–101 and accompanying text. 
151 See infra Subsection II.B.2. 
152 See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INSTITUTE 
OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE VICTIMIZATION: FINDINGS 
FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 33 (Jan. 2006) (finding that, among 
rape victims, 19.1 percent of adult women and 12.9 percent of adult men reported the crime to 
police); see also David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1222 (1997) (suggesting the probability that “unreported rapes are, 
disproportionately, acquaintance rapes”); Baker, supra note 51. 
153 See SOFI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 
1995–2013 1, 5 (Dec. 2014) (“For the period 1995–2013, females ages 18 to 24 had the highest rate of 
rape and sexual assault victimizations compared to females in all other age groups. . . . College-age 
male victims accounted for 17% of rape and sexual assault victimizations against students and 4% 
against nonstudents.”). 
154 Id. at 9. 
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counterparts.155 One reason is the predictability of a non-response.156 
Among non-students, nearly one in five surveyed did not report because 
“police would not or could not do anything to help.”157 Rape survivors are 
mostly foregoing the criminal justice system in anticipation of how their 
case will be (mis)handled.158 
The widespread perception that police are unlikely to pursue allegations 
of non-stranger rape is often accurate.159 Little has changed since a 1997 
survey demonstrated the unfounding, or deeming unsubstantiated, of rape 
 
155 See Colleen Murphy, Another Challenge on Campus Sexual Assault: Getting Minority Students 
to Report It, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 18, 2015), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Another-
Challenge-on-Campus/230977 [https://perma.cc/GE9D-GL49] (describing the reporting gap 
between white college women and college women of color and positing that the “layers of privilege” 
required to pursue a complaint through the college administrative process are often less available to 
minority students). Off campus, commentator Hannah Giorgis has posited that an “impossible 
hierarchy of acceptable victimhood” means that “black women who walk willingly into the rooms of 
men they call ‘brother’ are considered undeserving of protection from any violence that happens 
therein.” Hannah Giorgis, Many Women of Color Don’t Go to the Police After Sexual Assault for a Reason, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 25, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/25/women-of-
color-police-sexual-assault-racist-criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/GPL5-SC2Y]. Giorgis continues: 
If we report our assaults to police, we risk being retraumatized . . . by the violence of 
the criminal justice system itself, which treats rape victims like suspects. Worse yet, 
the police themselves commit assault with impunity; often, they target black women 
in particular, knowing our existence at the intersections of racism and misogyny make 
crimes against us far less likely to be investigated. To be “a good rape victim” is to 
immediately report your assault to the police (even knowing will likely never see 
“justice”), but to be a good black person is to avoid the police entirely because your life 
quite literally depends on it. The tightrope walk is impossible. 
Id.; see also Jennifer C. Nash, Black Women and Rape: A Review of the Literature, (Brandeis Univ. 
Feminist Sexual Ethics Project, June 2009), https://www.brandeis.edu/projects/fse/slavery/united-
states/slav-us-articles/nash2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN7G-5TKJ] (surveying literature on black 
women and rape, including studies finding that black women are less likely than white women to 
report rape). 
156 Sinozich & Langton, supra note 153, at 9. 
157 Id. The corresponding figure for students is nine percent. Id. Apart from their perceptions 
of the likely police response, victims’ own internalization of the public/private divide is reflected in 
the category “personal matter,” which was given as a reason for non-reporting by twenty-six percent 
of students and twenty-three percent of non-students. Id. 
158 Id.; see also Kimberly Hefling, Justice Department: Majority of Campus Sexual Assault Goes 
Unreported to Police, PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/four-
five-acts-campus-sexual-assault-go-unreported-police/ [https://perma.cc/L8X9-ZAWR] (quoting a 
sexual assault victims’ rights lawyer as explaining the massive underreporting of campus rape as 
significantly attributable to the fact that victims “know in our society that the only rapes that are 
taken seriously are those committed by strangers and are significantly violent”). 
159 See generally Kimberly A. Lonsway & Joanne Archambault, The “Justice Gap” for Sexual 
Assault Cases: Future Directions for Research and Reform, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 145 (2012) 
(documenting the attrition of rape allegations as cases progress through the criminal justice system); 
see also Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 152, at 33 (“[A]mong all women who were raped since age 18, 
only 7.8 percent said their rapist was criminally prosecuted, 3.3 percent said their rapist was 
convicted of a crime, and a mere 2.2 percent said their rapist was incarcerated.”). 
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allegations at disproportionately high rates160 while detailing the salient 
operation of police biases, especially in cases involving acquaintances.161 
Recent empirical research on policing consistently establishes the disparate 
treatment of rape,162 and failures to investigate sexual assault cases have 
been well documented.163 Consistent with this nation-wide data,164 police 
have systematically mishandled rape cases165 in jurisdictions including Los 
 
160 See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 152, at 1230 (“As with all crimes, the police decide whether 
a reported rape actually occurred, and attempt to determine who committed it. If they want the case to 
go forward, they ‘found’ the complaint and transmit the file to the prosecutor’s office.”); id. at 1233 
(noting that “the unfounding rate for rape is roughly four times than for other major crimes”). 
To make an arrest or “found” a complaint, the police merely require probable cause, a far lower 
evidentiary burden than the standard of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that the prosecutor 
must surmount at trial to convict. As the Supreme Court has explained, “‘[t]he substance of all the 
definitions’ of probable cause ‘is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’ And this ‘means less than 
evidence which would justify condemnation’ or conviction.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
175 (1949) (citation omitted). 
161 See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 152, at 1243 (“[M]ost observers agree that founding 
decisions in acquaintance rape case are strongly affected by the purported victim’s contributory 
negligence, and by her perceived immorality . . . . If police bias does indeed distort founding decisions, 
this appears to be the type of case in which most of the distortion occurs.”); see also SPOHN & TELLIS, 
supra note 87, iv (analyzing rapes reported to the Los Angeles Police Department from 2005–2009 and 
finding that the existence of a relationship between the victim and the suspect influenced case 
processing); supra notes 192–197 and accompanying text. David Bryden has also explained: 
Whatever their other disputes, rape-law scholars agree about several fundamental 
realities. They agree that, for practical purposes, forcible rape is really two crimes. The 
consensus is that the criminal justice system performs at least reasonably well in 
dealing with ‘aggravated’ rapes, defined as rapes by strangers, or men with weapons, 
or where the victim suffers ulterior injuries. With equal unanimity, scholars agree that 
the justice system often has performed poorly in cases involving rapes by unarmed 
acquaintances . . . and in which the victim suffers no additional injuries. Victims are 
less likely to report these acquaintance rapes (or even to recognize that they are rapes); 
if a victim does report it, the police are less likely to believe her; prosecutors are less 
likely to file charges; juries are less likely to convict; and any decision by an appellate 
court is more likely to be controversial. 
Supra note 135, at 317-18 (citations omitted). 
162 See supra note 161. An ongoing study funded by the National Institute of Justice is further 
exploring factors influencing the attrition of rape cases. Sandra Seitz, $1.2M Funds Study on Sexual 
Assault Case Processing, U. MASS. LOWELL (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.uml.edu/News/stories/
2013/SexualAssaultGrant.aspx [https://perma.cc/H2NG-F3F3]. 
163 See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text. 
164 See also supra note 80. 
165 For a helpful overview, see Rape in the United States: The Chronic Failure to Report and Investigate 
Rape Cases: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
55 (Sept. 14, 2010) (statement of Carol E. Tracy, Executive Director, Women’s Law Project). 
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Angeles,166 Baltimore,167 St. Louis,168 New Orleans,169 New York,170 Salt Lake 
County,171 Philadelphia,172 and Missoula, Montana.173 While the poor treatment 
of rape cases by police is generally rampant,174 police responses to sexual assault 
are particularly defective in cases involving women of color, immigrants, 
LGBTQ individuals, women in poverty, and sex workers.175 Officers’ 
 
166 See SPOHN & TELLIS, supra note 87. 
167 See Justin Fenton, City Rape Statistics, Investigations Draw Concern, BALT. SUN (June 27, 
2010), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-md-ci-rapes-20100519-story.html [https://perma.cc/
82GZ-Z3CX] (reporting that each year, more than thirty percent of cases investigated are “deemed 
unfounded,” which is five times the national average, and “in 4 of 10 emergency calls to police 
involving allegations of rape, officers conclude that there is no need for a further review, so the case 
never makes it to detectives”). 
168 See Jeremy Kohler, What Rape?, DART CENTER (Mar. 3, 2006), 
https://dartcenter.org/content/what-rape?section=2 [https://perma.cc/BT8N-S6NC] (reporting on 
the police practice of diverting rape complaints from formal processing channels). 
169 See Laura Maggi, NOPD Downgrading of Rape Reports Raises Questions, TIMES-PICAYUNE (July 11, 
2009), http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/07/nopd_downgrading_of_rape_repor.html [https://
perma.cc/A594-HCX7] (reporting that most reported rapes were classified as noncriminal). 
170 See John Eligon, Panel Seeks More Police Training on Sex Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/nyregion/03rape.html [https://perma.cc/6B38-MY7E] (reporting 
that the number of forcible rape complaints deemed unfounded had dramatically increased and that 
the category of sex crimes classified as misdemeanors had grown by six percent). 
171 See Erin Alberty & Janelle Stecklein, Study: Most Cases in Salt Lake County Never Prosecuted, 
SALT LAKE TRIB. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://archive.sltrib.com/story.php?ref=/sltrib/news/57323282-
78/cases-rape-police-victim.html.csp [https://perma.cc/6QR4-X8L6] (reporting on an audit of 270 
rape cases in Salt Lake County which showed that six percent were prosecuted). 
172 See Mark Fazlollah et al., Women Victimized Twice in Police Game of Numbers, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (Oct. 17, 1999), http://inquirer.philly.com/packages/crime/html/sch101799.asp [https://
perma.cc/F57K-WBNS] (reporting that hundreds of Philadelphia rape cases per year were 
“mothballed” by being administratively categorized as an “investigation of person,” and that such 
cases were not reflected in crime statistics). 
173 See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights & Michael W. 
Colter, U.S. Attorney for the Dist. of Mont., to John Engen, Mayor, Missoula 1 (May 15, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/missoulapdfind_5-15-13.pdf [https://perma.cc/US59-
4VSQ] (finding that “there are significant deficiencies in [the Missoula Police Department]’s 
investigations of sexual assault”). 
174 Regarding campus sexual assault allegations in particular, one study of six colleges in the 
midwest found that 171 reports to police resulted in only twelve arrests. Todd Lighty et al., Few 
Arrests, Convictions in Campus Sex Assault Cases, CHI. TRIB. (June 16, 2011), http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2011-06-16/news/ct-met-campus-sexual-assaults-0617-20110616_1_convictions-
arrests-assault-cases [https://perma.cc/5V2X-JYE5]. 
175 See generally AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, RESPONSES FROM THE FIELD: SEXUAL ASSAULT, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND POLICING (Oct. 2015), https://www.aclu.org/report/sexual-assault-
domestic-violence-and-policing [https://perma.cc/27YX-52MG]. The nationwide survey of more than 
900 advocates, service providers, and attorneys confirmed “the entrenched nature of long-recognized, 
gender-driven biases by police against domestic violence or sexual assault claims.” Id. at 40. The survey 
also underscored the problem of police bias against “survivors of color, and against survivors who 
are poor, Native American, immigrant, or LGBTQ.” Id.; see also infra note 190–207 (describing 
similar findings of the Detroit Sexual Assault Kit Action Research Project). An intersectional 
approach to equal protection requires accounting for the multitudinous ways that bias confronts 
victims. See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
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premature closings of rape investigations (frequently at the initial stages),176 
along with “unfounding” allegations at disproportionately high rates,177 are 
byproducts of credibility discounting.178 
On occasion, law enforcement officers make explicit their priors regarding 
the probability that a rape allegation is false. For instance, in March 2016, 
explaining his resistance to a law that would require the testing of sexual 
assault kits, an Idaho sheriff asserted that “the majority of our rapes that are 
called in, are actually consensual sex.”179 Similarly, in late 2015, a police chief 
at a Georgia college noted that “[m]ost of these sexual assaults are women 
waking up the next morning with a guilt complex. That ain’t rape, that’s being 
stupid. When the dust settles, it was all consensual.”180 
While it is rather unusual for law enforcement officers to publicly 
acknowledge and endeavor to legitimate systemic disbelief, studies indicate 
that skepticism of rape accusations is endemic.181 There is also abundant 
anecdotal evidence that police officers are discounting complainant credibility 
when responding to allegations of rape.182 Consider, as just one example, the 
 
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242-44 (1991); see also Nash, supra note 155, 
at 1 (summarizing research that underscored differences between experiences of sexual assault for 
black and white women, specifically: “black women are less likely to disclose rape, prosecutors are 
less likely to pursue criminal charges against an assailant when a black woman is the survivor, and 
jurors are more likely to believe that a white survivor’s assailant is guilty than a black woman’s 
assailant”). 
176 See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text (describing the problem of short-circuited 
investigations). 
177 See supra notes 160–78 and accompanying text. 
178 Credibility discounting is an especially common response to the kinds of allegations that are, 
in reality, most apt to be true. See Dobie, supra note 49 (“In a tragic twist, the most likely sexual-assault 
situations are often the ones most doubted or discounted by law enforcement—assaults involving drugs 
or alcohol, or those whose victims know their assailant or delay reporting the crime.”). 
179 Patricia Bowen, Bill Introducing Minimal Standard for Rape Kits Should Be Passed, ARBITER 
ONLINE (March 1, 2016), https://issuu.com/thearbiter/docs/3-1-16_online [https://perma.cc/3AQ3-9E2P]. 
180 Shannon Wiggins, ABAC Police Chief: Most Sexual Assaults ‘Ain’t Rape’, WALB NEWS (Nov. 11, 
2015), http://www.walb.com/story/30496970/abac-police-chief-most-sexual-assaults-aint-rape [https://
perma.cc/NH5L-PHU2]. The police chief added, “[i]t doesn’t happen here. It doesn’t show up here.” Id. 
For a similar orientation toward campus sexual assault allegations in particular, see Erica L. Green & 
Sheryl Gay Stoylberg, Campus Rape Policies Get New Look as the Accused Get DeVos’s Ear, N.Y. TIMES (July 
12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/12/us/politics/campus-rape-betsy-devos-title-iv-education-
trump-candice-jackson.html [https://perma.cc/] (reporting on comments by the head of the Department 
of Education’s Office for Civil Rights that “the accusations—90 percent of them—fall into the category of 
‘we were both drunk,’ ‘we broke up, and six months later I found myself under a Title IX investigation 
because she just decided that our last sleeping together was not quite right’”).  
181 See supra notes 78–80. 
182 According to a recent synopsis of the social science, “[o]fficers tend to overestimate the 
percentage of false reports, reflecting the myth that rape is rare.” Karen Rich & Patrick Seffrin, 
Police Interviews of Sexual Assault Reporters: Do Attitudes Matter?, 27 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 263, 265 
(2012) (citation omitted); see also Baker, supra note 51 (“The prospect of false rape claims seems to 
loom large in police perception.”). 
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case of Lara McLeod, who in 2011 was arrested for falsely reporting her rape 
before the charges were ultimately dropped.183 From the beginning, the 
detective who first interviewed McLeod appeared to doubt her claims.184 
Later, internal police documents and recordings would “show how grievously 
the police botched their investigation from start to finish, allowing their 
beliefs about sexual assault to influence the way they pursued the case.”185 In 
the end, with McLeod’s alleged rapist still uncharged, the police chief 
admitted that the investigation had been “shortcutted” while taking pains to 
underscore that “women do lie about rape, so it was important for officers not 
to be too credulous.”186 The chief added that “[i]t is not uncommon for people 
to make false, malicious, salacious allegations of sexual assault.”187 
The typical law enforcement investigation is guilt-presumptive (and 
potentially problematic for that reason). In sexual assault cases, this 
presumption is flipped. Investigators start from the proposition that the 
complainant is lying and act to confirm this belief. As the McLeod case 
demonstrates, the starting point and path to confirmation in rape cases are 
mirror images of typical investigations of other types of crime.188 Credibility 
discounting by police investigators curtails the collection of corroborative 
evidence that might otherwise mitigate the effects of downstream credibility 
discounts.189 Untested “rape kits” are concrete substantiation of this practice 
and emblematic of dismissive attitudes toward sexual assault allegations. 
 
183 Baker, supra note 51 (critiquing the investigation into McLeod’s allegation by Prince William 
County, Virginia police). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. Further: 
[Investigators] could have sought out the security footage from the 7-Eleven where 
Lara told him that Joaquin had taken her while they were arguing about whether she’d 
sleep with him . . . could have reviewed Lara’s medical records or run Joaquin’s name 
to see if he had ever come to the attention of local authorities before. The police record 




188 Under both circumstances, the steps taken by investigators are selected to advance an 
early-formed conclusion about the case. See supra note 48 (discussing the impact of initial 
impressions to find support for a particular outcome). 
189 See, e.g., Amanda Hess, Test Case: You’re Not a Rape Victim Unless Police Say So, WASH. CITY 
PAPER (Apr. 9 2010), http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/columns/the-sexist/article/13038641/test-
case-youre-not-a-rape-victim-unless-police-say [https://perma.cc/668M-MXCX] (“D.C.’s record of 
unfounded cases doesn’t include all the sexual assault allegations that are dismissed without so much as 
a report, nevermind an investigation. According to [an] MPD officer . . . ‘probably half ’ [of sexual 
assault allegations] ended in the determination that no police report would be filed.”); see also infra notes 
222–238 and accompanying text (discussing prosecutorial discounting of complainant credibility). 
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A 2015 study of the policing of sexual violence in Detroit provides the 
most thorough examination to date of untested (or “shelved”) rape kits.190 A 
rape kit, or forensic sexual assault examination, collects and preserves evidence 
obtained through an invasive physical examination of the victim, including hair, 
fibers, semen, saliva, skin cells, and blood.191 Importantly, the Detroit study offers 
an in-depth analysis of why police officers fail to test rape kits.192 What 
researchers discovered is that cases where suspect identity was not an issue—that 
is, cases involving non-strangers—were typically not considered worthy of 
investigation.193 In hundreds of interviews, police officers indicated that the 
failure to submit a rape kit for testing was reflective of a decision not to pursue 
the case. Put differently, the kits were shelved because the allegations had 
already been disregarded, not because the case was perceived as sufficiently 
strong even without the kit.194 As researchers explained: 
In many respects, the untested kits were a tangible sign about the dispositions 
of these cases—the case had been shelved, figuratively; the kit had been 
 
190 REBECCA CAMPBELL, ET AL., THE DETROIT SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT ACTION RESEARCH 
PROJECT, FINAL REPORT (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248680.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HU8T-CTZ6]. The Detroit study, which was funded by the National Institute 
for Justice, provides the most comprehensive examination of why police officers fail to test rape kits. 
But the study makes clear that the practices described extend far beyond Detroit or any particular 
jurisdiction. Indeed, evidence is mounting that untested rape kits are a national problem. In 2015, 
the “most detailed nationwide inventory of untested rape kits . . . found at least 70,000 neglected 
kits in an open-records campaign covering 1,000-plus police agencies—and counting.” Steve Reilly, 
Tens of Thousands of Rape Kits Go Untested Across USA, USA TODAY (July 16, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/07/16/untested-rape-kits-evidence-across-usa/29902199/ 
[https://perma.cc/83YV-EELN]. As the report noted, “[d]espite its scope, the agency-by-agency 
count covers a fraction of the nation’s 18,000 police departments, suggesting the number of untested 
rape kits reaches into the hundreds of thousands.” Id. As a functional matter, a rape kit may be 
considered “shelved” when the police fail to submit the evidence for testing or when a lab fails to 
process the evidence. 
191 For a description of the kind of evidence contained in a rape kit, see Lynn Hecht Schafran, 
Medical Forensic Sexual Assault Examinations: What Are They, and What Can They Tell the Courts?, 
JUDGES’ J., Summer 2015, at 16, 17-19. 
192 CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 190, at 60-137. Researchers counted over 11,000 sexual assault kits 
in police custody, of which 1600 were randomly selected for further study of case processing. Id. iii, v. 
193 Id. at 121 (“It appears then that the attitudes and beliefs among crime lab personnel were 
similar to those of the police in that victims suspected of prostitution, adolescent victims, and 
victims of non-stranger rape were not deemed credible and/or worthy of investigational and testing 
resources.”). A major finding of the study was that, among those kits submitted for testing, there 
was no statistically significant difference in “hit” rates for stranger and non-stranger sexual assaults. 
See id. at 172 (“If the DNA from a [sexual assault kit] matches to other sexual assault offenses . . . 
the hit reveals a pattern of serial sexual offending.”). Based on the “hit rate” equivalency, researchers 
concluded, “these data do not support prioritization of testing on the basis of victim-offender 
relationship.” Id. at 228. 
194 Id. at 136-37. 
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shelved, literally . . . . [A]s one police official put it: “The kits [that weren’t] 
tested were cases that we couldn’t or wouldn’t do anything about.”195 
Frequently, officers would “disbelieve victims who knew their assailants: 
police doubted victims’ credibility if they knew or were even minimally 
acquainted with the assailant.”196 When asked “how common it was that 
known associates, friends, and/or partners rape their partners, police 
acknowledged that it does happen, but, in their belief, not that often.”197 
Officers’ accounts of why they dismiss rape allegations were remarkably 
consistent with longstanding conceptions of the paradigmatic rape accuser.198 
A repeatedly expressed concern was that rape accusations are simply “revenge 
report[s].”199 For instance, as one officer related, “I don’t have time to deal 
with . . . wake-up and regret. You did what you did. That’s that. It’s not a 
crime and don’t take up our time with it.”200 The regret trope is premised on 
a notion that consensual sex is often rued in retrospect; this lament is 
perceived as the impetus for fabricating rape accusations.201 
Another prevailing sentiment is that, under certain circumstances, sex—with 
or without consent—is inevitable. According to researchers, many police 
officers suggested that victims “ought to expect ‘what they get’ if they invite 
someone over or agree to go somewhere with them.”202 As one investigator 
stated, “it might not be right, but it’s what happens, you go over there, what do 
you think’s gonna happen?”203 By placing blame on the victim, investigators 
directly shift responsibility away from the rapist. 
 
195 Id. at 105 (emphasis and alteration in original). The notion that the police “wouldn’t do 
anything” about certain cases was confirmed by data suggesting the operation of “negative beliefs 
and stereotypes about victims, which adversely affected the quality of the investigation.” Id. at 109; 
see also id. at 101 (reporting one interviewee’s assessment that “this is a crime that affects women, 
and in this city, that means Black women, poor Black women . . . there’s a good chunk of the 
explanation [for why kits aren’t submitted] right there.”). 
196 Id. at 115. Other specific attitudes that “appear to have negatively impacted case 
investigations (and ultimately [sexual assault kit] submissions” were that victims were engaged in 
prostitution/sex work, and that adolescent victims were claiming rape to “cover up for ‘bad’ 
behavior.” Id. at 109, 113. 
To analyze the influence of police attitudes toward sexual assault on case processing, the study 
utilized investigator reports “to illustrate how these beliefs appear to be enacted in practice.” Id. at 
118. While “acknowledg[ing] that police reports do not tell the full story of an investigation,” 
researchers underscored that “what was expressed, clearly and frequently, in the reports we reviewed 
was a widespread disbelief of victims, particularly those who might have been involved in sex work, 
those who were adolescents, and those who knew their offenders.” Id. 
197 Id. at 115. 
198 See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text. 
199 CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 190, at 115. 
200 Id. 
201 See supra note 105 (noting the improbability of revenge as motivation for a false report). 
202 CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 190, at 116. 
203 Id. 
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Related to this blaming tactic is an urge to discount the harm of non-
stranger rape. In interviews, this impulse was often cloaked by reference to 
the difficulties of disproving a defense of consent.204 But in actuality, 
investigators were deciding that the investment of time and effort in 
successfully closing a case was not worth the payoff.205 This implicit 
trivializing of acquaintance rape appears grounded in an intuition that rape 
within a relationship (or acquaintanceship) does not cause serious injury, likely 
because consent as a dividing line between sex and rape is not seen as all that 
significant.206 Remark on the “he-said, she-said” nature of non-stranger cases207 
is thus readily deployed to justify police refusal to investigate allegations 
that—even if provable—are deemed insufficiently serious to warrant the 
necessary expenditure of law enforcement resources.208 
2. Prosecutors 
Even when police “found” a rape complaint, prosecutors often choose not 
to pursue the case. To understand why prosecutors charge only a fraction of 
the sexual assault cases referred to them209 and how credibility discounts 
function at this stage of the process, we begin by considering the discretion 
generally afforded prosecutors. 
 
204 This concern is in tension with the low standard of probable cause. See supra note 160 
(defining the standard). 
205 See CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 190, at 115 (finding that “police expressed frustration 
about these kinds of cases because the accused perpetrators often claim that the incident was 
consensual, which law enforcement felt was difficult to prove or disprove”). When investigators were 
asked why lack of consent was “impossible” to prove, one clarified that “they can establish the 
elements of the crime, including lack of consent, but that it is often time-consuming to do so and 
time to invest in such cases is often limited.” Id. 
206 See supra notes 131–145 (describing the force requirement). See generally Tuerkheimer, supra 
note 136 (critiquing “criminal law’s consent problem”). 
207 But see CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 190, at 181 (noting that where the testing of previously 
shelved rape kits resulted in “hits” in non-stranger cases, “it became clear that the assailant had 
committed previous rapes,” changing things from “a ‘he-said, she-said’ case to a ‘he-said, she-said, 
she-said’ case”). 
208 One police investigator described how non-stranger rape cases are approached as follows: 
“if this [is] boyfriend-girlfriend stuff, then that’s not my business and I tell them that.” Id. at 116. 
209 See, e.g., Cassia Spohn, Dawn Beichner, & Erika Davis-Frenzel, Prosecutorial Justification for 
Sexual Assault Case Rejection: Guarding the “Gateway to Justice”, 48 SOC. PROBS. 206, 213 (2001) 
(finding that prosecutors in the jurisdiction studied rejected over forty percent of cases at the initial 
screening stage, and in just over eleven percent of cases, charges were filed but later dismissed, 
meaning that less than half of the cases received by the office were fully prosecuted). 
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Prosecutors make several key determinations,210 chief among them 
whether to charge a defendant with a crime.211 The various rules that apply 
to prosecutorial charging reference fairly low thresholds of evidence,212 
including probable cause213 and evidence sufficient to support a finding of 
guilt.214 In practice, however, prosecutors generally impose far more stringent 
standards on the decision to proceed with charges,215 including the belief that 
the case would likely result in a conviction at trial.216 
The “convictability standard,” as it is known, requires prosecutors to 
consider, not just whether jurors could convict based on the admissible 
evidence (the sufficiency standard), but whether jurors would probably do 
 
210 See generally Charles W. Thomas & W. Anthony Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 507 (1976); Sarah J. Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
383 (1976). 
211 See Spohn et al., supra note 209, at 206 (“None of the discretionary decisions made by the 
prosecutor is more critical than the initial decision to prosecute or not . . . Prosecutors have wide 
discretion at this stage [because] there are no legislative or judicial guidelines on charging and a 
decision not to file charges ordinarily is immune from review.”). 
Decisions regarding plea bargaining are also central to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
See generally Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 
(1968). 
212 See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, BYU L. REV. 669, 
679-80 (1992) (“The relevant disciplinary rule prohibits prosecutors from instituting criminal 
charges which they know or should know are not based upon probable cause. The relevant 
aspirational pronouncement of the Model Code is less precise, encouraging prosecutors to “seek 
justice . . . . The ABA Prosecution Standards, which have been adopted in many jurisdictions, do 
permit prosecutors to take into consideration their reasonable doubt about the defendant’s actual 
guilt, and do recommend charging based on sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction.”). 
213 See id. at 680-81 (“Probable cause is little more than heightened suspicion, and it is not even 
remotely sufficient to screen out individuals who are factually not guilty. More importantly, the 
criminal justice system itself provides for an early finding of probable cause, thus allowing the 
ministerial prosecutor to avoid any case-specific evaluation . . ..”). 
214 See id. at 681 (“The recommended threshold of the ABA Prosecution Standards—sufficient 
admissible evidence to support a conviction—is likewise far too easily satisfied to provide any real 
limitation upon, or incentive to exercise, case-specific evaluation by the prosecutor.”). Further, this 
standard arguably fails “to require the prosecutor to consider defenses known to the prosecutor,” and 
“to evaluate witness credibility.” Id. 
215 Many commentators have argued that ethical charging practices require individual 
prosecutors to be personally convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt. See, e.g., Bennett L. 
Gershman, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 353-54 (2001) (arguing that 
a “good prosecutor, after careful analysis and active preparation, will have no reasonable doubt of a 
defendant’s guilt and may appropriately pursue the case vigorously and fairly,” but that if he 
possesses unresolvable doubt, “then the only proper course is to dismiss the case, however difficult 
that action might be”). One factor to be considered in this determination may include, among many 
others, the probability of conviction. Id. 
216 According to the Prosecution Standards of the National District Attorneys Association, 
charging should further the interest of justice. NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL 
PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 4-2.4 (3d ed. 2009), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%
203rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20Commentary.pdf [https://perma.cc/2M7W-RJQR]. 
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so.217 In order to reach this conclusion, prosecutors endeavor to predict how 
jurors would likely evaluate the proof at trial, including the credibility of the 
complainant.218 Although this inquiry is not generally sanctioned,219 it is 
unsurprising that prosecutors with limited resources—and, less admirably, 
concerns about conviction rates—often incorporate the expected reaction of 
jurors into charging decisions.220 A prosecutor’s determination not to charge 
a defendant may thus encompass not only his or her own personal 
skepticism,221 but also anticipatory credibility discounting. 
Prosecutorial charging in sexual assault cases, especially those involving 
acquaintances,222 is inexorably linked to concerns—whether well-founded or 
not223—that jurors will downgrade the accuser’s credibility. As one prosecutor 
stressed, “[t]he bottom line is whether the jury will believe the victim. Rape 
cases rarely involve witnesses and don’t always involve physical evidence, so 
it all comes down to the victim and her credibility.”224 
It is difficult to know the extent to which these concerns provide cover for 
prosecutors themselves to engage in this discrediting.225 Put differently, we 
 
217 Credibility discounting by jurors is worth separate consideration. 
218 This calculus departs from what is required by the sufficiency standard, supra note 214, 
which considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 
219 See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 71 (3d ed. 1993) (“In cases which involve a serious threat to the community, 
the prosecutor should not be deterred from prosecution by the fact that in the jurisdiction juries have 
tended to acquit persons accused of the particular kind of criminal act in question.”). 
220 See infra notes 230–40; see also Jennifer G. Long & Elaine Nugent-Borakove, Beyond 
Conviction Rates: Measuring Success in Sexual Assault Prosecutions, STRATEGIES: PROSECUTORS’ 
NEWSL. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, Apr. 2014, at 1, 4 (noting that “for many reasons, ranging 
from bias to resource shortages to concern about conviction rates, prosecutors weed out far too many 
cases because they wrongly believe they cannot win them”). 
221 Id. at 5 (“[P]rosecutors’ determinations of the probability of conviction are easily influenced 
by their own biases, misconceptions or experiences. As such, if prosecutors are not regularly 
charging, investigating, preparing, and trying seemingly ‘challenging’ cases, they become incapable 
of determining whether cases are or are not likely to result in a conviction.” (citation omitted) 
(emphasis in original)). 
222 See Spohn et al., supra note 209, at 207-08 (“Several studies conclude that prosecutors are 
less likely to file charges if the victim knew the offender. These studies suggest that a prior 
relationship with the offender may raise questions about the truthfulness of the victim’s story . . . .” 
(citations omitted)). 
223 See infra notes 225–27 and accompanying text. 
224 Spohn et al., supra note 209, at 229. 
225 See Sofia Resnick, Why Do D.C. Prosecutors Decline Cases So Frequently? Rape Survivors Seek 
Answers, REWIRE (Mar. 11, 2016, 11:02 AM) https://rewire.news/article/2016/03/11/d-c-prosecutors-
decline-cases-frequently-rape-survivors-seek-answers/ [https://perma.cc/5P5N-TE9A] (recounting 
how survivors felt that prosecutors “seemed to disbelieve their stories or blame them for the alleged 
assault” and also questioned “to what degree the available evidence in their cases was carefully 
scrutinized [by prosecutors]”); see also Long & Nugent-Borakove, supra note 220, at 5 (warning 
prosecutors that “the challenge of sexual assault cases may appear, to the inexperienced eye, to be 
unsurmountable, thus creating a self-perpetuating cycle and a low number of cases being taken forward”). 
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cannot tell who precisely is wronging the complainant by discounting her 
credibility—the prosecutor or the imagined factfinder.226 For present 
purposes, however, this distinction matters less than the outcome generated 
by the prosecutor’s ostensible reliance on the jury’s expected response.227 
Even if this reliance is genuine or correct, it results in systemic credibility 
discounting.228 
Prosecutors’ explanations for their reluctance to charge word-on-word 
rape cases provide considerable support for the significance of downstream 
discounts.229 For instance, one prosecutor acknowledged that her office “does 
consider jury bias when determining whether to prosecute,” adding that, “A 
lot of the cultural attitudes about sexual assault come into play in a jury trial 
and are part of the consideration about whether or not we would be able to 
prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.”230 
Quantitative and qualitative research on prosecutorial charging practices 
is consistent with this account. Studies have demonstrated that “convictability 
 
226 See supra note 221 (noting that prosecutors’ biases may impact their analysis of the likely 
jury outcome). It is also worth emphasizing that jurors might reject the testimony of a witness or 
decide that the testimony (along with any other evidence in the case) does not constitute proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt without violating norms of epistemic justice. See infra Section III.B 
(elaborating on why credibility discounting is epistemically unjust). 
227 See Lisa Frohmann, Discrediting Victims’ Allegations of Sexual Assault: Prosecutorial Accounts of 
Case Rejections, 38 SOC. PROBS. 213, 224 (1991) (quoting one prosecutor’s assertion that “[t]here is a 
difference between believing a woman was assaulted and being able to get a conviction in court”). 
228 See Long & Nugent-Borakove, supra note 220, at 1 (observing that “[f]or many reasons, 
ranging from bias to resource shortages to concern about conviction rates, prosecutors weed out far 
too many cases because they wrongly believe they cannot win them”). 
229 See, e.g., Jennifer Temkin, Prosecuting and Defending Rape: Perspectives from the Bar, 27 J. L. 
& SOC’Y 219, 224 (2000) (finding, in a study of British barristers, that “[s]ave in stranger rape cases, 
it was felt [by prosecutors] to be extremely difficult to achieve a conviction where there was a lack 
of supporting evidence unless the complainant was ‘amazingly good’ in the witness box.”); Resnick, 
supra note 225 (“A common reason that [prosecutors in D.C.] give . . . when they decline to prosecute 
cases is that it is unlikely a jury would convict the accused rapist, based on the case’s set of 
circumstances.”). One prosecutor, expressing a fairly typical view, has said that she decides whether 
to move forward based on an account of the offense “that is credible and that is corroborated,” 
emphasizing that the “‘and’ is important.” Id. As other prosecutors have variously explained, proving 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is “enormously difficult for many sexual assault cases . . . . ‘The fact 
that this high legal standard can lead to our inability to prosecute a case should not be confused with 
victim-blaming . . . . It is the reality of a criminal justice system that has set a high bar.’” Id.; see also 
Leila Atassi, Fears of Juror Biases Often Prevent Rape Cases from Making It to Trial, Cuyahoga Prosecutors 
Say, CLEVELAND.COM (Oct. 24, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2010/10/
fears_of_juror_biases_often_pr.html [https://perma.cc/Z7AJ-V64Q] (“Prosecutors often feel they 
have to review their cases with consideration to how the facts might play on a jury. And that means 
many cases are never brought to trial or are pleaded down to lesser charges . . . .”). 
230 Resnick, supra note 225. As one victims’ advocate relayed, “what survivors often come away 
with is the idea that prosecutors just don’t want to take hard cases. They’re all hard. That’s the reality. 
They’re all hard cases.” Id. 
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is the organizational standard on which prosecutors file cases.”231 Anticipatory 
credibility discounting in rape cases is intersectional, as prosecutors 
contemplate a range of demographic characteristics perceived as relevant to 
the likelihood of juror belief.232 This calculus draws on a stock of narratives 
that “incorporate[] stereotypes of real crimes and credible victims.”233 In sum, 
framed by an inquiry into how the archetypical juror would assess the 
complainant’s account, prosecutorial decision-making transposes the 
widespread acceptance of rape myths into a legitimate rationale for declining 
to pursue charges.234 
The explanations provided by prosecutors for their charging decisions 
show that the paradigmatic rape accuser—she who lies and invites her 
rape235—is often deployed to justify discounted credibility determinations.236 
Invoking the inviting complainant, for instance, one prosecutor noted that, in 
non-stranger cases, “jurors typically have questions about her behavior at the 
time of the incident—why did she agree to go back to his room after the date, 
why did she agree to watch pornographic movies with him, and so on.”237 
 
231 Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, and Gender 
Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 531, 533 (1997). Relying on an 
ethnographic study of prosecutorial decisionmaking, Frohmann explains, “prosecutors orient 
particularly toward ‘the jury;’ they assess convictability based on their prior trial experience and 
cultural norms about sexuality, heterosexual relationships and violence, and then decide whether a 
credible narrative can be told.” Id. at 535-36. Based on the findings of her research, Frohmann 
emphasizes that “a prosecutor’s anticipated inability to get a guilty verdict from a jury is a legitimate 
justification for case rejection.” Id. at 536. 
232 Id. at 552 (arguing that the prosecutorial categorization of jurors “reveals how prosecutors 
maintain and reproduce cultural stereotypes about race, class, and gender through their 
decisionmaking practices”). 
For one demonstration of how prosecutors deploy anticipated juror biases regarding the victim, 
consider this deputy district attorney’s reasoning: “I don’t understand the kind of life [the 
complainant] lives. People in Mission Hills and Glen View [upper- and middle-class white suburbs] 
don’t understand it either. It is a lot easier to dirty up a victim like that. The defense will tear her to 
shreds. Her story is so unbelievable.” Id. at 546. This prosecutor “position[ed] himself closer to the 
jurors than to the victim,” and ultimately chose not to pursue the case. Id. at 546-47. 
233 Spohn, Beicher & Davis-Frenzel supra note 209, at 208. 
234 See id. at 216 (describing factors that led the prosecutor to think that the conduct in question 
was consensual). 
235 See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text (identifying the paradigmatic rape accuser). 
Although it is unusual for prosecutors to expressly suggest that a complainant has not been truly harmed 
by non-stranger rape, this notion is often implicit in justifications for non-charging decisions. 
236 Consider these examples from prosecutors’ explanations for the decision not to proceed 
with charges: “There appears to be a motive for the victim to fabricate . . . Victim clearly indicated 
that she has always disliked suspect, who was mother’s live-in boyfriend”;  
the victim admitted that “a couple of days before the assault, she and the defendant had consensual sex 
although they had broken up”; “the victim was very intoxicated on the night of the incident.” Spohn, 
Beicher & Davis-Frenzel, supra note 209, at 213, 215, 217. 
237 Id. at 230. 
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Conjuring the liar in order to defend a starting point of disbelief, one 
prosecutor urged: 
We have to recognize that there are situations in which people make false 
allegations—a woman may be angry at her husband, who is having an affair, and 
may see this as a way to get back at him. Or, a woman may falsely claim that she 
was raped in order to cover up a premarital or extramarital sexual relationship or 
to explain away a sexually transmitted disease or pregnancy. In these situations, 
you have to determine whether the victim is being truthful. You have to see if 
there are circumstances that allow you to conclude that the allegation is real.238 
Overall the prosecution of sexual violence is burdened by compounded 
credibility discounts, resulting in the assumption that jurors will prove 
unwilling to convict based on the complainant’s testimony. Where 
expected juror skepticism is the effect of prejudice—a subject to which we 
will shortly turn239—prosecutor deference to the likely trial outcome 
begets epistemic injustice. 
III. THEORIZING THE CREDIBILITY DISCOUNT 
Integral to the criminal justice system’s response to sexual assault is the 
practice of what I am calling “credibility discounting.” To conceptualize this 
practice, I draw on the idea of epistemic injustice developed in Miranda 
Fricker’s seminal work, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing.240 
In recent years, Fricker’s framework has become quite influential in 
philosophical quarters241 while barely penetrating the legal academy.242 
 
238 Id. 
239 See infra notes 249–57 and accompanying text. 
240 MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER & THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 
(2007). As one review notes, the book is truly “ground-breaking” in that Fricker “names the 
phenomenon of epistemic injustice, and distinguishes two central forms of it . . ..” Rae Langton, Book 
Review, 25 HYPATIA 459, 459 (2010). While Fricker is generally credited with advancing the concept 
of epistemic justice, she was not the first to do so. See Rachel McKinnon, Epistemic Injustice, 
PHILOSOPHY COMPASS 437, 438 (2016) (noting that, prior to Fricker’s work addressing the concept, 
“there’s a long history in black feminist thought, and other feminists of color, that should be seen as 
also working on issues of epistemic injustice”). 
241 See, e.g., Lackey, supra note 63, at 1 (“[I]n recent years, the issue of testimonial injustice has gained 
traction in academic circles. The idea that people can be victims of injustice by having their testimony 
rejected or devalued simply because they’re black or female, for instance, is now widely accepted.”); 
McKinnon, supra note 240, at 442-43 (“In short, the broad topic of epistemic injustice is currently the 
center of a rapidly expanding and exciting literature . . . . Looking back, I suspect that future 
epistemologists will see the recent focus on issues of epistemic injustice as a watershed moment.”). 
242 A notable exception, where Fricker’s work is discussed at some length, is Rebecca Tsosie, 
Indigenous Peoples and Epistemic Injustice: Science, Ethics and Human Rights, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1133 
(2012). 
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Epistemic injustice is a distinctive type of injustice in which a person is 
wronged in her capacity as a knower.243 Because each of us is socially situated,244 
our judgments about which claims to credit are bound up in power and, often, 
prejudice.245 Fricker identifies two types of epistemic injustice—testimonial and 
hermeneutical—which together provide a useful vantage on the practice of 
credibility discounting in sexual assault cases. 
A. Failures of Belief 
Broadly speaking, testimonial injustice occurs when a credibility 
assessment results from prejudice.246 The use of “testimony” in this context 
does not correspond to its legal meaning; it simply refers to the effort to 
communicate a factual assertion. 
Although prejudice can sometimes lead to unwarranted elevations of 
credibility,247 testimonial injustice is defined by unwarranted credibility 
reductions.248 With this kind of epistemic dysfunction, “prejudice will tend 
surreptitiously to . . . deflate the credibility afforded the speaker, and sometimes 
 
243 FRICKER, supra note 240. 
244 Fricker’s analysis proceeds from this premise; given its rather distinctive qualities, her 
methodological approach is worth describing at some length: 
A socially situated account of a human practice is an account such that the participants 
are conceived not in abstraction from relations of social power (as they are in traditional 
epistemology, including most social epistemology) but as operating as social types who 
stand in relations of power to one another. This socially situated conception makes 
questions of power and its sometimes rational, sometimes counter-rational rhythms arise 
naturally as we try to account for the epistemic practice itself. Many philosophical 
questions may be best served by the traditional, maximally abstracted conception of the 
human subject, but confining oneself to that conception restricts the sorts of 
philosophical questions and insights one can come up with, so that philosophical 
repertoire incurs a needless impoverishment. Starting from the socially situated 
conception, by contrast, allows us to trace some of the interdependencies of power, 
reason, and epistemic authority in order to reveal the ethical features of our practices 
that are integral to those practices. Ultimately, the point is to see how our epistemic 
conduct might become at once more rational and more just. 
FRICKER, supra note 240, at 3-4. For further discourse on the function of power in social relations, 
see id. at 9-17. 
245 See infra notes 249–57 and accompanying text. 
246 FRICKER, supra note 240, at 1 (“Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer 
to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word . . ..”). 
247 A “credibility excess” may be found where “prejudice results in the speaker’s receiving more 
credibility than she otherwise would have.” Id. at 17. The converse is a “credibility deficit.” Id.; see 
also supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text. 
248 Id. at 21 (“The primary characterization of testimonial injustice . . . remains such that it is 
a matter of credibility deficit and not credibility excess.”). For the reasoning behind this conclusion, 
see id. at 20-21. 
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this will be sufficient to cross the threshold for belief or acceptance so that the 
hearer’s prejudice causes him to miss out on a piece of knowledge.”249 
Integral to this conception is the idea of prejudice, which mainly enters a 
testimonial exchange “via stereotypes that we make use of as heuristics in our 
credibility judgements.”250 In accordance with what social psychology tells us 
about human decisionmaking,251 stereotypes can be defined as empirical 
generalizations about a particular social group.252 Although these 
generalizations may in theory be reliable,253 in social practice the stereotypes 
we rely upon are often unreliable or prejudiced. 
Moreover, consider the impact of power and group identity on the 
deployment of familiar stereotypes. As Fricker observes: 
Many of the stereotypes of historically powerless groups such as women, black people, 
or working-class people variously involve an association with some attribute inversely 
related to competence or sincerity or both: over-emotionality, illogicity, inferior 
intelligence, evolutionary inferiority, incontinence, lack of ‘breeding’, lack of moral 
fibre, being on the make, etc. A first thing to say about such prejudicial stereotypes is 
that in so far as the association is false, the stereotype embodies an unreliable empirical 
generalization about the social group in question.254 
Negative identity prejudice, as Fricker calls it, is especially concerning 
because it tends to be “resistant to counter-evidence.”255 
This is not to suggest that prejudicial stereotypes are consciously maintained 
and mobilized in our epistemic exchanges; just the opposite is true.256 Even so, 
 
249 Id. at 17; see supra notes 74–75 (discussing degrees of belief). 
250 Id. at 30. Fricker employs “stereotype” in a “neutral sense,” meaning that “stereotypes may 
or may not be reliable.” Id. 
251 Id. at 31 (“The past few decades have witnessed a shift away from a view of judgements as 
the products of rational, logical decision making marred by the occasional presence of irrational 
needs and motives toward a view of the person as [a] heuristic user.” (citation omitted)). 
252 Id. at 31. For elaboration on the idea of stereotypes and its variation along multiple 
dimensions, see id. at 30-31. 
253 Id. at 30 (suggesting that stereotypes can constitute a “proper part of the hearer’s rational 
resources in the making of credibility judgements”). 
254 Id. at 32. Fricker further suggests that epistemic culpability results when these judgements 
are maintained “without proper regard for the evidence.” Id. at 33. Although much of Fricker’s work 
explores the circumstances that give rise to epistemic culpability when a hearer resorts to prejudiced 
stereotypes, in this Article I concentrate less on this ethical question than I do on the justice angle. 
255 Id. at 35. A negative identity-prejudicial stereotype is “a widely held disparaging association 
between a social group and one or more attributes, where this association embodies a generalization 
that displays some (typically, epistemically culpable) resistance to counter-evidence owing to an 
ethically bad affective investment.” Id. A testimonial injustice may be considered systematic if the 
identity prejudice causing it “track[s] the subject through different spheres of social activity, 
rendering them susceptible to other forms of injustice besides testimonial.” Id. at 155; see Lackey, 
supra note 63, at 3 (where prejudice “tracks the subject through different dimensions of social 
activity—economic, educational, professional, and so on—it is systematic, and the type of prejudice 
that tracks people in this way is related to social identity, such as racial and gender identity.”). 
256 See FRICKER, supra note 240, at 36 (asserting her belief that “the right vision of epistemic 
relations is such that testimonial injustice goes on much of the time, and while it may be hard enough 
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being situated in a structurally unequal social landscape—one in which group 
identities shape individual relations—cannot but impact how we make sense of 
the world.257 
Of course, the normalcy of testimonial injustice258 does not negate its 
wrongfulness. Most glaring in this regard is the “purely epistemic harm” that 
occurs when knowledge that should be imparted to a hearer is irrationally 
rejected.259 Not only does the hearer experience a truth deficit, but so too 
does the epistemic ecosystem in which the hearer is embedded. Consider, for 
instance, a police officer’s resort to a negative identity prejudice to evaluate a 
rape accuser’s credibility. If the initial report is perceived as false, there may 
be no further investigation; the case will be closed based on faulty factual 
premises. Even apart from the disadvantage that flows to the hearer (and the 
epistemic ecosystem of which the hearer is part), the speaker is significantly 
harmed “in her capacity as a knower” when she experiences testimonial 
injustice. This harm—a “primary harm,” in Fricker’s terms—has gone largely 
unnoticed in legal discourse.260 
To describe the contours of the primary harm, we might begin by 
observing that a speaker whose capacity as a knower is undermined has been, 
in important respects, dehumanized.261 Rationality is a core feature of 
humanity. The capacity to share knowledge is “essential to human value.”262 
In its starkest iteration, to deny one’s capacity as a knower then is to deny 
one’s humanity.263 As Fricker argues: 
The fact that the primary injustice involves insult to someone in respect of a 
capacity essential to human value lends even its least harmful instances a 
 
to police one’s beliefs for prejudice, it is significantly harder reliably to filter out the prejudicial 
stereotypes that inform one’s social perceptions directly”). 
257 See id. at 38-39 (“The collective social imagination inevitably contains all manner of 
stereotypes, and that is the social atmosphere in which hearers must confront their interlocutors. 
No wonder the prejudicial elements in the social imagination can impinge on our credibility 
judgements without our say-so.”). 
258 See id. (noting that the typicality of testimonial injustice is consistent with the fact that 
“injustice is in fact a normal social baseline, while active cries of resentment and demands for 
rectification are the precious exception”). 
259 See id. at 43 (“There is of course a purely epistemic harm done when prejudicial stereotypes 
distort credibility judgements: knowledge that would be passed on to a hearer is not received. This 
is an epistemic disadvantage to the individual hearer, and a moment of dysfunction in the overall 
epistemic practice or system.”). 
260 Cognizing the harm of epistemic injustice also holds promise beyond the realm of sexual 
violence, particularly for racial oppression. See infra notes 282, 333 and accompanying text. 
261 FRICKER, supra note 240, at 44. 
262 Id. 
263 See id. (“No wonder too that in contexts of oppression the powerful will be sure to 
undermine the powerless in just that capacity, for it provides a direct route to undermining them in 
their very humanity.”). 
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symbolic power that adds a layer of harm of its own: the epistemic wrong 
bears a social meaning to the effect that the subject is less than fully human. 
When someone suffers a testimonial injustice, they are degraded qua knower, 
and they are symbolically degraded qua human. In all cases of testimonial 
injustice, what the person suffers from is not simply the epistemic wrong in 
itself, but also the meaning of being treated like that.264 
The treatment of a subject as incapable of giving knowledge is a form of 
objectification, which often induces the would-be speaker’s silencing.265 This 
silencing can take more than one form. At times, an objectifying stance on 
the part of the hearer leads to a “failure of uptake” that prevents the words 
from registering as communication.266 At other times, hearer prejudice 
preempts a testimonial exchange altogether,267 denying a victim of 
testimonial injustice the very opportunity to speak.268 This latter dynamic, 
 
264 Id. For further discussion of the epistemic harms of testimonial injustice, including the loss 
of epistemic confidence, see id. at 47-51. Based on these harms, Fricker mounts a persuasive case that 
“[w]here it is not only persistent but also systematic, testimonial injustice presents a face of 
oppression.” Id. at 58. 
265 As Catharine MacKinnon has observed: “Objects do not speak. When they do, they are by 
then regarded as objects, not as humans, which is what it means to have credibility.” CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSE OF LIFE AND LAW 182 (1987) (quoted in 
FRICKER, supra note 240, at 139)); see also id. at 132 (“[T]estimonial injustice—especially when it is 
systematic—also wrongfully deprives the subject of a certain fundamental sort of respect . . . . The 
subject is wrongfully excluded from the community of trusted informants, and this means that he is 
unable to be a participant in the sharing of knowledge . . . . He is thus demoted from subject to object.”). 
On the connection between epistemic objectification and sexual objectification, see id. at 139-42. 
266 Id. at 140 (“Like pre-emptive testimonial injustice, such cases of silencing involve a massive 
advance credibility deficit, but here it is in advance of an utterance that is forthcoming. What is not 
forthcoming is any genuine credibility judgement in respect of the speaker’s utterance . . . . [H]er 
utterance simply fails to register with his testimonial sensibility.” (emphasis omitted)). Fricker 
provides the example of a woman whose stated “No” in a sexual encounter “does not receive its 
required uptake from a man, with the result that her would-be illocution thereby fails to 
communicate—it fails to even be the illocutionary act it would be been.” Id. 
267 Fricker refers to this “commonplace form of testimonial injustice” as preemptive 
testimonial injustice. Id. at 130. She explains: 
[T]hose social groups who are subject to identity prejudice and are thereby susceptible 
to unjust credibility deficit will, by the same token, also tend simply not to be asked to 
share their thoughts, their judgements, their opinions. (If the word of people like you is 
generally not taken seriously, people will tend not to ask for it.) This kind of testimonial 
injustice takes place in silence. It occurs when hearer prejudice does its work in advance 
of a potential informational exchange: it pre-empts any such exchange. 
Id.; see also id. at 131 (noting that the phenomenon of preemptive testimonial injustice can function 
as a “mechanism of silencing”). 
268 Id. (“[N]ot being asked is one way in which powerless social groups might be deprived of 
opportunities to contribute their points of view to the pool of collective understanding.”). 
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variously referred to as “pre-emptive testimonial injustice”269 or “testimonial 
smothering,”270 keeps a would-be speaker from ever sharing her account.271 
All told, testimonial injustice tends to exacerbate oppression, not only of the 
speaker herself,272 but also of the prejudged groups to which she may belong.273 
Because prejudice is commonly rooted in structures of power,274 the suppression 
of knowledge overwhelmingly disadvantages those who are already 
subordinated.275 
B. Failures of Understanding 
Hermeneutical injustice undermines one’s ability to make sense of certain 
experiences—typically, experiences not shared by those with greater power 
to shape the realm of interpretation.276 As we will see, hermeneutical injustice 
and testimonial injustice overlap in important respects.277 But before 
exploring this intersection, it is useful to isolate the unjust failures of 
understanding that characterize the realm of hermeneutical injustice. 
A starting premise is that power influences the ability to participate in the 
construction of social experience.278 As a result, particular areas of social 
 
269 See supra note 267. 
270 See Kristie Dotson, Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing, 26 HYPATIA 
236, 244 (2011) (identifying a kind of “testimonial oppression [that] occurs because the speaker 
perceives one’s immediate audience as unwilling or unable to gain the appropriate uptake of 
proffered testimony”). This “testimonial smothering,” as Dotson calls it, involves the “truncating of 
one’s own testimony in order to insure that the testimony contains only content for which one’s 
audience demonstrates testimonial competence.” Id. 
271 Dotson identifies three conditions that generally lead to testimonial smothering: i) the 
content of the testimony is unsafe/risky; ii) the audience demonstrates testimonial incompetence 
with respect to the content of testimony; and iii) testimonial incompetence flow from, or appears to 
flow from, “pernicious ignorance.” Id. at 249. 
272 See Lackey, supra note 63, at 15 (discussing how credibility deficits or surpluses “beget[] 
downstream injustices”). 
273 See FRICKER, supra note 240, at 58-59 (“A culture in which some groups are separated off 
from [an essential] aspect of personhood by the experience of repeated exclusions from the spread 
of knowledge . . . would indeed be one in which a species of epistemic injustice had taken on the 
proportions of oppression.”). 
274 See supra notes 249–57 and accompanying text. 
275 See supra note 268. 
276 See FRICKER, supra note 240, at 1 (“[H]ermeneutical injustice occurs at a prior stage [to 
testimonial injustice], when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair 
disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences.”); see also Linda Martín Alcoff, 
Epistemic Identities, 7 EPISTEME 128, 129 (2010) (explaining that “whereas testimonial injustice wrongly 
responds to speech, hermeneutical injustice preempts speaking. Testimonial and hermeneutical 
injustice are in this way distinct on [Fricker’s] view, though they can be mutually supportive.”). 
277 See infra notes 293–99 and accompanying text. 
278 As Fricker explained, 
One way of taking the epistemological suggestion that social power has an unfair 
impact on collective forms of social understanding is to think of our shared 
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life—hermeneutical “hotspots”279—come to be defined by markedly unequal 
participation in the construction of meaning.280 This hermeneutical 
marginalization, as Fricker describes it, is problematic because it “renders the 
collective hermeneutical resource structurally prejudiced.”281 As examples,282 
Fricker cites the framing of “sexual harassment as flirting, rape in marriage as 
non-rape, post-natal depression as hysteria, reluctance to work family-
unfriendly hours as unprofessionalism, and so on.”283 Rape myths too are a 
type of hermeneutical injustice.284 What these illustrations reveal is that 
membership in a group with relatively scant social power can correspond to 
a distinct hermeneutical disadvantage: experiences not shared by the 
 
understandings as reflecting the perspectives of different social groups, and to 
entertain the idea that relations of unequal power can skew shared hermeneutical 
resources so that the powerful tend to have appropriate understandings of their 
experiences ready to draw on as they make sense of their social experiences, whereas 
the powerless are more likely to find themselves having some social experiences 
through a glass darkly, with at best ill-fitting meanings to draw on in the effort to 
render them intelligible.” 
FRICKER, supra note 240, at 148. Fricker considers recognition of this power structure as a tenet of 
feminist theory. Id. at 147. 
279 See id. at 152 (defining hotspots as “locations in social life where the powerful have no 
interest in achieving a proper interpretation, perhaps indeed where they have a positive interest in 
sustaining the extant misinterpretation”); see also id. at 151 (hermeneutical disadvantage renders a 
subject “unable to make sense of her ongoing mistreatment, and this in turn prevents her from 
protesting it, let alone securing effective measures to stop it”). 
280 See id. at 153 (“When there is unequal hermeneutical participation with respect to some 
significant area(s) of social experience, members of the disadvantaged group are hermeneutically 
marginalized.”). 
281 Id. at 155. A structurally prejudiced hermeneutical resource “will tend to issue 
interpretations of [a subordinated] group’s social experiences that are biased because insufficiently 
influenced by the subject group, and therefore unduly influenced by more hermeneutically 
powerfully groups.” Id. 
282 Fricker focuses her discussion on gender, but hermeneutical injustices often occur with 
regard to race. See, e.g., McKinnon, supra note 240, at 441 (noting a “tremendous resistance to the 
concept of ‘white privilege’ by white people, particularly in US contexts” as an example of 
hermeneutical injustice for people of color). 
283 FRICKER, supra note 240, at 155. With regard to hermeneutical marginalization, which is 
generally suffered by socially powerless groups, Fricker adds: 
[F]rom the moral point of view, what is bad about this sort of hermeneutical 
marginalization is that the structural prejudice it causes in the collective hermeneutical 
resource is essentially discriminatory: the prejudice affects people in virtue of their 
membership of a socially powerless group, and thus in virtue of an aspect of their social 
identity. It is, then, akin to identity prejudice. Let us call it structural identity prejudice. 
Id.  
284 See generally Katharine Jenkins, Rape Myths and Domestic Abuse Myths as Hermeneutical 
Injustices, 34 J. APPLIED PHIL. 191 (Feb. 2017). 
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powerful find no meaningful outlet in collective notions of reality. This is the 
essence of hermeneutical injustice.285 
The structural disadvantage that undermines the ability to make sense of 
an experience varies along multiple axes.286 First, a collective misunderstanding 
can deviate from the subject’s interpretation to greater or lesser extents.287 
Next, the subject may not understand her own experience adequately; or if 
she is able to communicate it to similarly situated group members she 
nonetheless may be powerless to convey it to the community at large.288 Last, 
the subject might find herself epistemically disadvantaged by the collective’s 
misunderstanding of the content of her experience or by the form in which that 
content is expressed.289 
 Regardless of how it manifests, hermeneutical injustice renders a 
member of the discriminated-against group “unable to make communicatively 
intelligible something which it is particularly in his or her interests to be able 
to render intelligible.”290 As a result, the would-be speaker is unfairly excluded 
 
285 As Fricker defines it, hermeneutical injustice is “the injustice of having some significant 
area of one’s social experience obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity 
prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource.” FRICKER, supra note 240, at 155. 
286 See Fricker, supra note 75, at 1319 (observing that hermeneutical injustice “comes in different 
degrees of severity, and along more than one dimension”). 
287 See id. (arguing that “there is internal diversity as regards the degree of misunderstanding;” 
for example, domestic violence viewed as acceptable versus domestic violence viewed as 
unacceptable but treated in keeping with myths like victims leave)). 
288 Id. 
289 Id. at 1319-20. For a lengthier discussion of this dimension, see FRICKER, supra note 240, 
at 160-61. 
290 FRICKER, supra note 240, at 162. 
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from participating in the spread of knowledge.291 This, as we have already seen 
in the context of testimonial injustice, represents a profound primary harm.292 
Finally, we arrive at the junction of testimonial and hermeneutical 
injustices. To see how the two converge in a “double epistemic injustice,”293 
let us take up the question of timing: when precisely does a hermeneutical 
injustice occur, particularly since a subject’s exclusion from the collective 
knowledge pool is ongoing?294 Fricker pegs the injustice to the moment when 
the would-be speaker confronts the practical impossibility of conveying her 
experience to the wider world.295 This insight suggests that members of 
marginalized groups tend simultaneously to confront the deflation of their 
 
291 Id. This harm is very much related to the harm of testimonial injustice: 
The primary harm of (the central case of) testimonial injustice concerns exclusion 
from the pooling of knowledge owing to identity prejudice on the part of the hearer; 
the primary harm of (or central case of) hermeneutical injustice concerns exclusion 
from the pooling of knowledge owing to structural identity prejudice in the collective 
hermeneutical resource. The first prejudicial exclusion is made in relation to the 
speaker, the second in relation to what they are trying to say and/or how they are saying 
it. The wrongs involved in the two sorts of epistemic injustice, then, have a common 
epistemic significance running through them—prejudicial exclusion from participation 
in the spread of knowledge. 
Id. In later work, Fricker recasts this idea: 
[T]here is a generic wrong to any kind of epistemic injustice . . . which is a matter of 
the subject being wronged specifically in their capacity as an epistemic subject. In respect of 
testimonial justice, this generic wrong becomes somewhat specified in the idea of the 
subject’s being wronged as a giver of knowledge (an unjust deficit of credibility); and 
in respect of hermeneutical injustice it becomes the idea of the subject’s being wronged 
in their capacity for social understanding (an unjust deficit of intelligibility). These 
two forms of the intrinsic ethical-epistemic wrong of epistemic injustice are then 
supplemented by the observation that various more general epistemic ills tend to 
emanate from them—notably, the hearer’s missing out on knowledge offered, and the 
decline in the circulation of epistemic goods in the social epistemic system. . . . Thus 
the wrong of epistemic injustice against an individual tends to ramify into wider social 
epistemic loss. 
Fricker, supra note 75, at 1320. 
292 See supra notes 261–73 and accompanying text. The subject who finds herself unable to convey 
her experience to her larger community may also suffer a further epistemic disadvantage—that is, a 
diminished belief in her capacity to make sense of the world. FRICKER, supra note 240, at 163. 
293 FRICKER, supra note 240, at 160; see also supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text 
(discussing double discounting). 
294 See supra notes 278–281 (defining hermeneutical marginalization). 
295 FRICKER, supra note 240, at 159 (“[T]he hermenueutical inequality that exists, dormant, in 
a situation of hermeneutical marginalization erupts in injustice.”). Put differently, the “background 
condition for hermeneutical injustice is the subject’s hermeneutical marginalization,” but the 
“moment of hermeneutical injustice comes only when the background condition is realized in a more 
or less doomed attempt on the part of the subject to render an experience intelligible, either to 
herself or to an interlocutor.” Id. 
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own credibility296 and a collective misunderstanding of the experience sought 
to be communicated.297 When this happens, “the speaker is doubly 
wronged.”298 Testimonial injustice is thus exacerbated by hermeneutical 
injustice and vice versa.299 
This returns us to the credibility discount, which lies at the nexus of both 
categories of epistemic discrimination. 
IV. DISCOUNTING AS DISCRIMINATION 
Thus far, I have described the phenomenon of credibility discounting, 
identified it as a widespread form of law enforcement practice and argued 
that it constitutes an unrecognized type of injustice that results in overlooked 
harm. Here, I urge the legal redress of this harm by defining credibility 
discounting as potentially actionable discrimination. 
A. Toward Legal Redress 
Only after an injury is identified as such can the question of legal redress 
be contemplated, thereby refashioning the meaning of the violation. Among 
the most dramatic illustrations of this dialectic is sexual harassment, which 
once was largely invisible as an experience, but ultimately became a cause of 
action.300 The example underscores the power of law to transform a widely 
pervasive social practice.301 
 
296 See supra Section III.A. 
297 See supra notes 277–92 and accompanying text. Fricker also argues, 
That hermeneutical injustice most typically manifests itself in the speaker struggling to 
make herself intelligible in a testimonial exchange raises a grim possibility: that 
hermeneutical injustice might often be compounded by testimonial injustice. This will 
indeed tend to be the case wherever the hermeneutical injustice is systematic, because 
members of multiple marginalized groups will tend to be subject to identity prejudice. If 
they try to articulate a scantly understood experience to an interlocutor, their word already 
warrants a low prima facie credibility judgement owing to its low intelligibility. But if the 
speaker is also subject to an identity prejudice, then there will be a further deflation. 
FRICKER, supra note 240, at 159. 
298 Id. To further elaborate, the speaker is wronged “once by the structural prejudice in the 
shared hermeneutical resource, and once by the hearer in making an identity-prejudiced credibility 
judgment.” Id. This observation maps nicely onto the construct of credibility, which encompasses 
both plausibility and trustworthiness. See supra Part I.B. 
299 FRICKER, supra note 240, at 160 (“[T]he implausibility of what is said creates a lens through 
which the personal credibility of the speaker may become unduly deflated, which in turn creates a lens 
through which the credibility of what is said may come to be even more deflated . . . and so on.”). 
300 See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN (1979) (describing the evolution of sexual harassment from a legally ignored commonplace 
social practice to a cognizable cause of action). 
301 Around the time that her decisive work on the theory and legal treatment of sexual 
harassment was coming to fruition, Catharine MacKinnon wrote: “Sexual harassment, the 
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For present purposes, the analogy is also instructive for other reasons. 
Like sexual harassment, credibility discounting, in the sexual assault context 
and beyond,302 is a form of discrimination based on group membership. This 
is not to say that credibility discounting is only a form of discrimination; it 
might additionally be a tort, for instance.303 But the discrimination rubric 
provides an especially nice fit, as it captures the social dimensions of the 
practice,304 along with its inequality-perpetuating features. 
To conceive of credibility discounting as a form of discrimination that 
should be actionable under certain circumstances raises a host of questions, 
the answers to which are largely dependent on context. As a general 
proposition, discriminatory conduct has varying legal consequences and 
available redress, depending on the actor and the setting. For instance, 
behaviors that might otherwise be considered sexually harassing are legally 
cognizable only in certain contexts—primarily the workplace and school 
environs—and not in others (say, the street). Likewise, a rape accuser might 
find redress for credibility discounting by a police detective or campus 
administrator, but not a skeptical neighbor. 
Moreover, even where a behavior is considered actionable discrimination, what 
precisely the law prohibits varies. On campus, discrimination that undermines 
educational opportunity is the problem;305 in the workplace, discrimination that 
interferes with the job matters;306 and in the criminal justice system, discrimination 
that distributes protection unequally is prohibited. 
 
experience, is becoming ‘sexual harassment,’ the legal claim. As the pain and stifled anger have 
become focused into dissatisfaction, gripes have crystallized into a grievance, and women’s inner 
protest is becoming a cause of action.” Id. at 57. 
302 On the relevance of credibility discounting for practices of racial oppression, see supra notes 
282, 333 and accompanying text. 
303 Cf. MACKINNON, supra note 300, at 171-73 (describing the appeal and limitations of tort law 
for redressing sexual harassment). MacKinnon concludes: “All of this is not to say that sexual 
harassment is not both wrong and a personal injury, merely that it is a social wrong and a social injury 
that occurs on a personal level. To treat is a tort is less simply incorrect than inadequate.” Id. at 173. 
304 See id. at 174 (noting that such practices “express and reinforce the social inequality of 
women to men are clear cases of sex-based discrimination”). By positing that credibility discounting 
in particular is a case of sex-based discrimination, I do not mean to suggest that only female rape 
accusers receive credibility discounts, that all female rape accusers receive credibility discounts, or 
that females who report other crimes are treated with similar skepticism. Nevertheless, as embodied 
by the paradigmatic rape accuser, constructions of gender and female sexuality are central to the 
discounting dynamic. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. Once again, MacKinnon’s work 
on sexual harassment is relevant here, as she has observed that “[w]omen’s sexuality is a major 
medium through which gender identity and gender status are socially expressed and experienced.” 
MACKINNON, supra note 300, at 182. 
305 Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex in any federally funded education program 
or activity. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972). 
306 Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and 
national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964). 
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Returning to the discrimination at issue when credibility is discounted, 
rape complainants307 should rely on federal civil rights guarantees (Title IX 
in particular) when discounts are meted out on campus. Systemic skepticism 
of claims of sexual violations constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex, 
which federal law prohibits. 
Most germane to the law enforcement context, rape complainants should 
rely on the constitutional guarantee of Equal Protection when law 
enforcement officials engage in credibility discounting. I now develop this 
Equal Protection argument. 
B. Credibility Discounting as Unequal Protection 
To ground the claim that credibility discounting should count as unlawful 
discrimination under existing jurisprudential frameworks, I turn to the 
doctrinal setting most appropriate to address credibility discounting by police 
departments in particular.308 By outlining the parameters of an Equal 
Protection claim, specifically, I aim to begin a conversation about how best to 
translate the theory—credibility discounting as discrimination—to law.309 
Given this ambition, I set aside legitimate critique of existing Equal 
Protection jurisprudence.310 Rather, I show how the articulation of a separate 
 
307 As one important example, interventions on the part of the Obama Administration’s Justice 
Department into local police departments revived the “protection model” of Equal Protection. 
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1287, 1310, 1322-34 
(2016). 
As I have argued, the Justice Department’s deployment of “pattern or practice” enforcement 
authority substantially increased police accountability for discriminatory underenforcement of the 
law—particularly of the law against sexual assault. Id.  
308 See supra Subsection II.B.1 (discussing in depth credibility discounting by police). 
309 Litigation is of course not the only mechanism for change (nor is it necessarily the best). 
For several reasons, including but certainly not limited to litigation threats, voluntarily implemented 
best practices in policing and prosecuting sexual violence are proliferating, creating tremendous 
potential to disrupt systemic credibility discounting. See Dobie, supra note 49 (“Across the country, 
in this city and that jurisdiction, improvements in sexual-assault investigation are slowly being made 
. . . . [D]etectives are trained extensively in interviewing trauma victims, making suspects the focus 
of their investigations and dismantling their assumptions about ‘real rape’ and how a ‘real victim’ is 
supposed to respond.”); see also Brown, supra note 53 (describing a new nationwide curriculum for 
college administrators and campus police officers); Long & Nugent-Borakove, supra note 220 
(pointing to an evolution in best prosecutorial practices). To be clear, strategies to combat the 
workings of bias (implicit and explicit) are piecemeal solutions. More global responses to epistemic 
injustice would alleviate the need to constantly correct for the prejudices that develop along lines of 
power. Even so, the movement to reduce biased policing (both on and off campus) and biased 
prosecution should be celebrated. Assuming these techniques, properly implemented, continue to 
spread, we may yet witness a significant shift in how the credibility of rape complainants is assessed. 
310 It should, however, be noticed that the Court’s discriminatory-intent requirement has 
proven especially problematic. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1287 (1987) (arguing that racial 
discrimination is substantially motivated by unconscious bias, making “intent” hard to establish); see 
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form of discrimination might work in practice. I do so by analyzing a lawsuit 
currently pending in federal district court.311 My contention is that alleging a 
practice of credibility discounting would bolster the plaintiff ’s “failure to 
protect” claim. By contemplating the contours of this augmented claim, we 
can begin to envision a model for future Equal Protection litigation. 
Ultimately, this more robust legal response can help to delegitimate 
practices of discounting that remain commonplace, propelling much needed 
cultural transformation. 
 
*      *      * 
 
On May 16, 2010, Heather Marlowe and a group of her friends attended 
San Francisco’s Bay to Breakers race.312 According to her complaint: 
While at Bay to Breakers, Marlowe was handed a beer in a red plastic cup by 
a male attendee, and Marlowe drank the beer. Subsequently, Marlowe began 
feeling much more inebriated than would have been normal given her 
moderate alcohol consumption up to that point. Marlowe regained 
consciousness inside an unfamiliar home approximately 8 hours after she was 
last seen at Bay to Breakers. Marlowe was physically injured, experienced 
vaginal and pelvic pain, was nauseous and vomited several times, was dazed, 
 
also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1321 n.170 
(1991) (noting that intent “requires perpetrators to know what they are doing and why” and that 
“[m]ost discrimination does not happen this way”); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer 
Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1138 (1997) (stating 
that discriminatory purpose “is a juridical concept that does not reflect prevailing understandings 
of the ways in which racial or gender bias operates”). 
311 Complaint, Marlowe v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 3:16-cv-00076-MMC (N.D. 
Cal. filed Oct. 21, 2016) [hereinafter Marlowe Complaint] (filing suit against San Francisco for 
engaging in a practice of failing to assure evidence of sexual assaults was not lost and failing to 
diligently investigate allegations of sexual assault). Although Marlowe may be the first of its kind, it 
is reasonable to expect such lawsuits to becoming increasingly commonplace. See, e.g., Jane Doe v. 
Village of Robbins, No. 1:17-cv-00353 (N.D. Ill. Filed Jan. 17, 2017) (alleging an Equal Protection 
violation based on a police department’s widespread failure to investigate rape allegations). 
312 All facts are drawn from the “Second Amended Complaint for Damages,” which was filed in 
the Northern District of California on October 21, 2016. Marlowe Complaint, supra note 311. The First 
Amended Complaint was dismissed for failure to allege facts sufficient to support the allegation that 
“defendants have treated sexual assault reports from women with less priority than other crimes not 
involving women reporting sexual assaults,” with leave to file for purposes of amending the equal 
protection claim. Marlowe v. City and County of San Francisco, No. 3:16-cv-00076-MMC (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 27, 2016) (order granting motion to dismiss and affording plaintiff leave to amend). 
Early in 2017, the district court dismissed the Second Amended Complaint. Order Granting 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Marlowe v. City and County of San Francisco, Case No. 16-cv-
00076-MMC (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2017). In a brief opinion, the court concluded that Marlowe had 
included “no facts” to support the allegations that sexual assault complainants were treated “less 
favorably than persons who are similarly situated.” Id. Marlowe has appealed the ruling to the Ninth 
Circuit. 
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confused, and had no memory of what had occurred in the house. Marlowe 
asked a man sitting in the bed with her what had happened. The man told 
Marlowe, “we had sex.” At this point, Marlowe realized that she had been 
drugged and raped.313 
Soon after, Marlowe went to the nearest emergency room, where a 
specially trained nurse collected a “rape kit.” The San Francisco Police 
Department (SFPD), which took Marlowe’s report at the hospital, indicated 
that the evidence would be processed in the next fourteen to sixty days.314 
The following week, Marlowe performed a Google search for the person 
she believed had raped her—it is unclear from the complaint how she was 
able to draw this connection. After locating a picture of a man that resembled 
her memory of the rapist, Marlowe contacted Police Officer Joe Cordes, the 
SFPD officer investigating her allegation. According to the complaint, 
Cordes responded by 
instruct[ing] Marlowe to make contact with Suspect, and flirt with him in 
order to elicit a confession that Suspect had indeed raped Marlowe. Cordes 
also instructed Marlowe to set up a date with Suspect to prove that Marlowe 
could identify Suspect in a crowd. Cordes told Marlowe that, if she refused 
to engage in this action, SFPD would cease its investigation of her rape.315 
When Marlowe later met with Cordes to “clarify what [he] wanted [her] 
to do,” Cordes “strongly discouraged Marlowe from further pursuing her case, 
indicating that it was too much work for the SFPD to investigate and 
prosecute a rape in which alcohol was involved.”316 Eventually, after 
repeatedly attempting to set up the “date,”317 as Cordes had instructed, 
Marlowe contacted Cordes to inform him that she “refused to continue to 
privately investigate her case.”318 Only then did SFPD inform Marlowe that 
the suspect had been taken in for questioning and his DNA sample collected. 
Marlowe was told that the suspect’s DNA was being processed at the lab, and 
that her rape kit results would be available shortly.319 
 
313 Marlowe Complaint, supra note 311, at *3. 
314 Id. at *4. 
315 Id. at *4. 
316 Id. 
317 Id. As the complaint describes: “Marlowe created an alias and began communicating with 
Suspect. Marlowe purchased a disposable mobile phone in order to text with Suspect, without 
revealing her true phone number. Eventually, Marlowe set up a ‘date’ with Suspect . . . . Suspect 
cancelled the ‘date’ and subsequently cancelled a second ‘date  . . . .’” Id. 
318 Id. at *5. 
319 Id. 
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Over the course of the next two years, Marlowe unsuccessfully sought 
testing of her rape kit.320 At one point, “Marlowe was told that due to the 
passage of time, her case was considered ‘inactive’ and was placed in a storage 
facility. SFPD also told Marlowe that because she was ‘a woman,’ ‘weighs less 
than men,’ and has her ‘menstruations,’ that Marlowe should not have been 
out partying,” on the day of the incident.321 When her kit was finally tested, 
Marlowe discovered that her experience was not unusual. In 2014, after first 
denying the existence of a backlog, SFPD acknowledged that “several 
thousand” rape kits dating back to 2003 remained untested.322 
Marlowe sued the City of San Francisco, along with various top police 
officials, alleging a violation of Equal Protection323 and seeking damages and 
injunctive relief.324 The complaint charges that the police department “had the 
policy, practice and/or custom of failing to diligently investigate sexual assault 
allegations,”325 as evidenced by its failure to test thousands of rape kits.326 
Regardless of whether Marlowe ultimately prevails, it is worth observing 
that, even on its face, her claim is sufficiently broad to encompass far more 
than the shelved rape kits. Although Marlowe’s complaint focuses on SFPD’s 
failure to test her rape kit, she could (and perhaps would, were the case ever 
to proceed to discovery and trial) provide a rich chronicle of why her 
allegations were deemed unworthy of investigation. We see glimpses of this 
discounting already (she invited her rape by drinking too much; her account 
of having been drugged is dismissed; her casual acquaintance with her alleged 
rapist is perceived as a mitigating factor), but there is far more to say about 
the deep skepticism that led not only to the police refusal to test her rape kit, 
but to its decision to place her case on “inactive” status. 
Perhaps more important, expanding the allegations to encompass SFPD’s 
practice of credibility discounting substantially strengthens the case for 
 
320 Marlowe’s efforts, which are detailed in her complaint, were met with various explanations 
from SFPD regarding reasons for the delay. Id. at *5-6. On October 20, 2012, SFPD informed 
Marlowe that her rape kit had at last been tested and placed in the national DNA database (CODIS), 
although this latter fact would later become the subject of further dispute. Id. at *6-8. Marlowe 
ultimately managed to succeed in having her rape kit tested only after involving various well-placed 
connections in city and state government (a network that—it should be emphasized—very few rape 
accusers are able to access). 
321 Id. at *6. 
322 Id. at *7; see supra note 190 (describing the national rape kit backlog). 
323 The complaint alleges a deprivation of both federal and state equal protection guarantees 
per 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the California Constitution, respectively. 
324 The complaint seeks an order “requiring Defendants to test all “back logged” rape kits, and 
enjoining Defendants from continuing with their institutional policy of failing and/or refusing to 
properly investigate sexual assaults and test rape kits.” Marlowe Complaint, supra note 312, at *2. 
325 Id. at *8. 
326 Id. at *10. SFPD allegedly acknowledged that it would only test rape kits in cases involving 
unknown suspects. Id. at *11. 
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discrimination. To succeed on the merits, Marlowe must demonstrate that she 
was provided an unequal measure of police protection, at least in part, because 
she is a woman.327 The existence of shelved rape kits is relevant to this claim, 
but it is only part of the story of how sexual assault survivors confront a law 
enforcement regime predisposed to dismiss their complaints. 
Recall the Detroit Sexual Assault Kit Action Research Project, which 
established that the failure to submit a rape kit for testing meant that the 
police had already decided not to pursue an investigation.328 As demonstrated 
by this study and others like it, shelved rape kits result from credibility 
discounting. Indeed, they are powerful, tangible evidence of it. Incorporating 
this deeper causal account into claims of unequal protection exposes the 
discrimination driver. 
CONCLUSION 
Credibility discounting is a pervasive feature of our legal response to rape. 
Even today, rape accusers remain subject to a pronounced credibility 
discount. This discount involves downgrades both to plausibility 
(corresponding to hermeneutical injustice) and to trustworthiness 
(corresponding to problems of testimonial injustice).329 By surfacing the 
 
327 One framing of this burden is captured by the defendants’ argument on their motion to dismiss: 
The first question in any equal protection claim is to identify the classification of the 
comparison groups. Here, the proper comparison group is victims of rape. Plaintiff 
has not, and cannot, allege that the Department treats male rape kits differently . . . . 
Nothing here suggests that anyone intentionally treated female rape victims 
differently from male rape victims. 
Defendants’ Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff ’s First Amended Complaint, Marlowe 
v. City & County of San Francisco, No. 3:16-cv-00076-MMC (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2016) (citation 
omitted). Marlowe contends, not that female rape victims were treated differently from male rape 
victims, but that SFPD’s “policy [of failing to properly investigate sexual assault reports made by 
women] was intentional and, when enforced, had a discriminatory impact on women.” Marlowe 
Complaint, supra note 312, at *13-14. To prove intentional discrimination, as I have suggested, the 
inclusion of credibility discounting in an equal protection claim might well bolster the case. 
In its order affording Marlowe leave to amend her equal protection claim, the court cited a 
different legal standard—rational basis review—which, even absent evidence of gender 
discrimination, might prohibit treating sexual violence differently from other crimes. Order 
Granting Motion to Dismiss & Affording Plaintiff Leave to Amend, Marlowe v. City & County of 
San Francisco, No. 3:16-cv-00076-MMC, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2016) (citing Navarro v. Block, 
72 F.3d 712, 715-717 (9th Cir. 1995) (allowing equal protection claim to proceed to give plaintiffs the 
opportunity to prove that sheriff ’s differential response to domestic violence/non-domestic 911 calls 
was not rational). Gender-based “failure to protect” litigation has mostly involved domestic violence 
and rarely prevailed. Niji Jain, Comment, Engendering Fairness in Domestic Violence Arrests: Improving 
Police Accountability Through the Equal Protection Clause, 60 EMORY L.J. 1011, 1019-21 (2011). 
328 Supra notes 190–208 and accompanying text. 
329 Testimonial smothering also manifests as widespread failure to report rape. See supra notes 
152–158, 267–271 and accompanying text (separately discussing the two dynamics). 
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discounting phenomenon, I have endeavored to give content to its practice, 
first by reviewing the legal rules that once formally embedded skepticism of 
rape complaints, and then by highlighting a contemporary outlet for this 
skepticism in police and prosecutorial responses to sexual violence. 
Throughout this migration from law to law enforcement, the paradigmatic 
rape accuser has maintained her hold. She is a woman who falsely reports 
rape because she is vengeful, regretful, or too intoxicated to know better; she 
invites rape; she needlessly complains about rape when the perpetrator is an 
acquaintance. Often when police officers and prosecutors confront an 
allegation of sexual violence, they unduly doubt the trustworthiness of the 
complainant and the plausibility of her account. In the main, reports of sexual 
assault are met with skepticism born of prejudice. Absent a true reckoning 
with how sexual assault victims are perceived by those with the power to 
dismiss their claims, future reform efforts, both on and off campus, will 
inevitably be constrained.330 
Theorizing credibility discounts as epistemically unjust represents a 
significant conceptual advance. Identifying the systemic downgrading of 
credibility as itself a problem—a problem with a specific name331 and developed 
theoretical underpinnings—facilitates an understanding of all that is at stake 
when rape complaints are unduly disregarded. This discussion has centered on 
primary epistemic harms, which have until now mostly escaped attention. 
Epistemic injustice also undermines norms of equal citizenship, especially 
when the downgrading party is a state actor and where the speaker’s account 
is not just any account, but one that tells of violation. These concerns are 
distinctive and separately deserving of our attention.332 Within the realm of 
sexual violence and beyond—perhaps especially in the context of racial 
oppression333—contemplating the political dimensions of epistemic injustice 
 
330 See supra notes 48–58 and accompanying text (detailing the importance of credibility in the 
treatment of rape allegations). 
331 As Robin West has observed, “[a]n injury uniquely sustained by a disempowered group will 
lack a name, a history, and in general a linguistic reality.” Robin L. West, The Difference in Women’s 
Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 85 (1987). 
Although West was writing in the context of gender-specific suffering, her point is generalizable to 
gendered harms and, beyond, to harms disproportionately suffered by subordinated groups. 
332 Fricker begins to develop this aspect of epistemic injustice in later work. Fricker, supra note 
75. Relying on the work of political philosopher Philip Petit, she posits that epistemic injustice can 
“disable a contester, thus rendering them dominated.” Id. at 1324. The upshot is that “institutional 
bodies to whom citizens may need to contest must, on pain of facilitating domination, achieve 
epistemic justice in their hearings.” Id. at 1326. 
333 See, e.g., Jack Healy & Nikole Hannah-Jones, A Struggle for Common Ground, Amid Fears of 
a National Fracture, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/10/us/a-struggle-for-
common-ground-amid-fears-of-a-national-fracture.html [https://perma.cc/8LFE-5KUQ] (describing 
a nation “increasingly . . . mired in bloodshed and blame” confronting sizeable “discrepancies in the 
everyday lives of black and white Americans”). 
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has the potential to enrich a newly revived national conversation about the 
full implications of inequality. 
Our construction of knowledge is bound to reflect the hierarchies in which 
we are situated. In a more just world, each of us would be able to meaningfully 
contribute to the constitution of a collective reality, which only then could be 
transformed. 
 
